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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a capital case; it is literally a matter of life and death for Timothy Dunlap. On 
appeal, Mr. Dunlap is challenging both his death sentence and the district court's order 
summarily denying him post-conviction relief, and thus an opportunity to be heard. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously set forth in 
Mr. Dunlap's Appellant-Petitioner's Brief (hereinafter "Appellant's Br."). They need not be 
repeated but are incorporated here by reference. (Appellant's Br., pp.1-3.) 
ARGUMENT! 
Direct Appeal/Idaho Code Section 19-2827 Issues2 
O. Mr. Dunlap's Sentencing And Direct Appeal Issues Are Subject To Mandatory Review By 
This Court Under Idaho Code Section 19-2827 
The direct appeal/Idaho Code Section 19-2827 (hereinafter "Section 19-2827") issues 
Mr. Dunlap raised in his Appellant's Brief have not changed; they need not be repeated, but are 
incorporated here by reference. (Appellant's Br., pp.3-6.) In the Brief of the Respondent 
(hereinafter "Resp. Br."), the State seeks to change the issues Mr. Dunlap raised on appeal by 
"rephrasing" the issues on appeal (Resp. Br., pp.3-4), a method not recognized by this Court's 
rules. Presumably, the State did not believe its "rephrased" issues warranted a cross-appeal, as 
none was filed. See Idaho Appellate Rule (IAR) 15(a)(permitting a timely cross-appeal where 
reversal, vacation or modification of a judgment is sought); but see State v. Fisher, 140 Idaho 
365,373 (2004) (State's request for appellate court to affirm conviction and suppression order on 
different legal theory than that relied upon by district court is not a request for affirmative relief 
and is properly brought as an additional issue on appeal rather than a cross-appeal from the 
order). 
1 Mr. Dunlap maintains that by citing this Court to the record and transcripts which contain his 
district court pleadingslbriefing, including related attachments/exhibits, he incorporates those 
items by reference herein and they are properly before this Court for consideration, without the 
need for "exhaustive argument" which is "neither required nor desired by our appellate rules and 
the interests of judicial efficiency." Phipps v. Phipps, 124 Idaho 775, 778 (1993) (noting that 
appellant's brief on appeal to the district court "incorporated therein her brief to the magistrate 
judge .... [Respondent's] argument, therefore is unpersuasive. The issue ... was properly before 
the magistrate judge and the district judge."); see also IAR 35(a)(6). 
2 Where a reply to specific claims is not necessitated by the Respondent's Brief, Mr. Dunlap 
relies on his prior briefing. For those issues which require a response, for the sake of consistency 
and ease of reference, Mr. Dunlap relies on the same numbering in his Appellant's Brief. 
2 
Similarly, it appears the State did not believe its "wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal" 
were compelling enough to comply with IAR 35(b)(4): "In the event the respondent contends 
that the issues presented on appeal listed in the appellant's brief are insufficient, incomplete, or 
raise additional issues for review, the respondent may list additional issues presented on appeal 
. . . ." (Emphasis added); Fisher, 140 Idaho at 373 ("Therefore the State does not seek 
affirmative relief and properly brought the issue as an additional issue on appeal instead of being 
required to cross appeal from the previous district court order."). That the "state wishes to 
rephrase the issues on appeal" is not a contention that the issues presented in Mr. Dunlap's 
Appellant's Brief "are insufficient, incomplete, or raise additional issues for review[.]" Instead, it 
is an expression of the State's attempt to dictate which issues Mr. Dunlap, the non-prevailing 
party, will be allowed to raise on appeal, and which issues this Court can consider. 
The truth is the State has failed to raise, brief and support with argument the additional 
issue it really wants this Court to consider on appeal: Whether State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 
(2010)3 allows this Court to disregard its statutory duty under Section 19-2827 to independently 
review death sentences? The State's failure to raise this as an additional issue on appeal, let alone 
acknowledge the existence of Section 19-2827, constitutes a waiver of this issue on appeal. State 
v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471 (2010) (vacating conviction where district court erred in failing to 
conduct IRE 403 analysis and State did not argue error was harmless); State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 
3 In Perry, this Court reformulated the fundamental error test, holding that errors not objected to 
at trial shall only be reviewed on appeal if the defendant persuades the appellate court that the 
error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly 
exists without the need for additional information not in the appellate record; and (3) was not 
harmless. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. If the appellate court is so persuaded, then the conviction 
must be vacated and the case remanded. Id. 
3 
259, 263 (1996) ("A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is 
lacking, not just if both are lacking."); cf State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 509, 515 n.4 (2010) 
(although State raised good faith exception for first time on appeal and this Court has repeatedly 
refused to consider issues not raised below, the State's failure was based on an unforeseen 
outcome in a Supreme Court case on point and thus would be considered in the interest of 
fairness). Regardless, Section 19-2827 does not allow application of Perry to bar this Court's 
review of sentencing errors in death penalty cases. 
History of Section 19-2827: Section 19-2827 was enacted in 1977, on the heels of two of 
the most significant decisions in death penalty jurisprudence: Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 
(1972) (per curiam) and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976). In Furman, the court 
held the imposition and execution of the death penalty on the facts of the three cases before it, 
two involving rape/murder and one involving a non-homicide rape, constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 408 U.S. at 239-40. A 
majority of the Furman court declined to reach the broader question of whether the death penalty 
was per se cruel and unusual punishment, and thus unconstitutional in all circumstances, 
implying instead that a capital sentencing scheme that could rationally distinguish those who 
deserved to die, from those who did not, would be upheld. Id. 
Jurisdictions that wanted to keep death as a sentencing option rose to the challenge and 
began modifying their statutes to address the Furman court's concerns about the arbitrary and 
capricious imposition and execution of the death penalty. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-80. Some did 
so by making the death penalty automatic, or mandatory, for certain kinds of murder, thereby 
eliminating all discretion from the sentencing process. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
4 
U.S. 280 (1976) (statute prescribing mandatory death penalty for first-degree murder violates 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). Others adopted statutes which separated the guilt and 
sentencing phases of a capital trial, and then required the sentencer's discretion be guided by 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. It was this latter approach which, a mere four years 
after Furman, the court approved. 
In Gregg, the Court first concluded that the punishment of death for murder was not per 
se violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; the Court then upheld Georgia's post-
Furman capital sentencing statutes against Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment challenges. Id. 
The Court found that the adoption of clear and objective aggravating circumstances, one of 
which had to be found before a jury could decide death was appropriate, coupled with the 
requirement that jurors consider mitigating circumstances, sufficiently narrowed the class of 
individuals subject to the death penalty, thereby limiting the arbitrariness and capriciousness 
condemned by Furman. Id. at 196-98. The Gregg court attached significant importance to the 
mandatory automatic review of death sentences by Georgia's Supreme Court, including whether: 
(1) the sentence was imposed under the influence of passion or prejudice; (2) whether the 
evidence supported the jury's finding of aggravating circumstances; and (3) whether the sentence 
was disproportionate compared to other sentences imposed in similar cases. Id. at 198 (citing Ga. 
Stat. § 27-2537(c) (Supp. 1975)). 
The provision for appellate review in the Georgia capital-sentencing system 
serves as a check against the random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. 
In particular, the proportionality review substantially eliminates the possibility 
that a person will be sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant jury. If a time 
comes when juries generally do not impose the death sentence in a certain kind of 
murder case, the appellate review procedures assure that no defendant convicted 
under such circumstances will suffer a sentence of death. 
5 
Id. at 206. Shortly after the Gregg decision, legislatures began tailoring their death penalty 
statutes to be consistent with the Georgia statute, including the mandatory appellate review 
provision; Idaho was no exception. See State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405,409 (1981) (noting the 
legislature added Section 19-2827 to meet the Supreme Court's objections to Idaho's death 
penalty statute). 
When the Idaho Legislature adopted Section 19-2827 in 1977, it imposed upon this Court 
an independent duty to review the entire sentencing record in capital cases for error, irrespective 
of whether those errors were raised below or on appeal. See I.e. § 19-2827(a) ("Whenever the 
death penalty is imposed, and upon the judgment becoming final in the trial court, the sentence 
shall be reviewed on the record by the Supreme Court of Idaho."); I.C. § 19-2827(b) ("The 
Supreme Court of Idaho shall consider the punishment as well as any errors enumerated by way 
of appeal."); see also Hoffman v. A rave, 236 F.3d 523, 536 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Although petitioner 
failed to raise this claim in his consolidated appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, the Idaho death 
penalty statute requires mandatory review of the entire record for sentencing errors. . . . All 
sentencing errors are treated as implicitly raised, removing the bar of procedural default. "), cert. 
denied, 534 U.S. 944 (2001). 
Application of Section 19-2827: This Court has repeatedly acknowledged "section 19-
2827 of the Idaho Code imposes an affirmative duty on this Court to review the imposition of the 
death penalty. In addition, this Court must consider possible errors in sentencing that are not 
raised by the defendant or were not objected to at his trial." State V. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 94 
(1998) (citing Osborn, 102 Idaho at 405)). 
This general rule applicable to appellate review of error is not necessarily 
controlling where we are statutorily required to undertake appellate review 
6 
irrespective of the defendant's contentions, if any. Death is clearly a different kind 
ofpunishrnent from any other that may be imposed, and I.C. § 19-2827 mandates 
that we examine not only the sentence but the procedure followed in imposing that 
sentence regardless of whether an appeal is even taken. This indicates to us that we 
may not ignore unchallenged errors. Moreover, the gravity of a sentence of 
death and the infrequency with which it is imposed outweighs any rationale that 
might be proposed to justify refusal to consider errors not objected to below. 
Osborn, 102 Idaho at 41 0-11 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, pursuant to Section 19-
2827, this Court must review errors arising from Mr. Dunlap's capital sentencing proceeding and 
Perry simply does not apply. 
Since the adoption of Section 19-2827, undersigned counsel can locate only one capital 
case where the State asked this Court to limit its review of error. In State v. Wood, a capital 
defendant alleged for the first time on appeal that the district judge abused his discretion by 
failing to sua sponte recuse himself from presiding over the defendant's case, but failed to cite to 
any authority. 132 Idaho at 94-95. The State asked this Court to apply State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 
at 263, and find the defendant's failure to cite authority constituted a waiver of the issue on 
appeal. Wood, 132 Idaho at 94. In rejecting the State's request, this Court recognized it has an 
affirmative statutory duty in capital cases to review both the procedure used to impose a death 
sentence and the sentence itself, even where an appeal is not taken. Id. at 94-95; see also State v. 
Wells, 124 Idaho 836, 836 & n.l (1993) (this Court's review of the defendant's death sentence 
pursuant to Section 19-2827 even though the defendant had dismissed both his petition for post-
conviction relief and his appeal). 
Although Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) significantly changed the landscape of 
capital sentencing in Idaho by constitutionally mandating a shift in sentencing findings from 
judges to juries, neither it nor the Legislature changed this Court's affirmative duty to 
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independently review the entire sentencing record in capital cases for error. Thus, appellate 
review in capital sentencing proceedings in governed by Section 19-2827 and Perry does not 
apply. 
1. The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Limiting Individual Voir Dire To Five Minutes In 
Violation OfMr. Dunlap's Fifth, Sixth And Fourteenth Amendment Rights And His Article 1, 
Sections 7 And 13 Rights To A Trial Before A Fair And Impartial Jury And Trial Counsels' 
Failure To Object To The Limitation Deprived Mr. Dunlap Of His Sixth Amendment Right To 
Counsel 
Trial counsel had only five minutes to learn potential individual jurors' biases and 
prejudices, to understand what potential jurors knew of Mr. Dunlap and his case, to learn the 
nature and depth of their relationships with state witnesses, the victim, and the victim's family, to 
hear potential jurors express in their own words their feelings about the death penalty, to observe 
their body language, to assess their demeanor, and try to figure out who among them had already 
decided Tim Dunlap should die; in short, five minutes was insufficient for counsel to gather 
information necessary to intelligently exercise for cause and peremptory challenges and protect 
Mr. Dunlap's right to a fair trial before an impartial jury. 
Trial counsel did not object to the five-minute limit, which was created and proposed by 
the State, along with other voir dire procedures, each of which the district court deferred to and 
adopted verbatim. 4 (R.32773, pp.536, 570-74, 602-03.) Not only did the five-minute limit on voir 
dire violate Mr. Dunlap's Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States 
Constitution, as well as his Article 1, Sections 7 and 13 Idaho constitutional rights to a fair trial 
before an impartial jury, the district court's deference to the State for voir dire procedures was an 
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abuse of discretion. See State v. Larsen, 129 Idaho 294, 295-96 (Ct. App. 1996); see also 
Appellant's Br., pp.6-9. 
On appeal, the State makes much of the fact potential jurors completed questionnaires, as 
if the questionnaires rendered individual questioning unnecessary. (Resp. Br., pp.5, 7.) While the 
questionnaire did contain some general questions about potential jurors' knowledge of 
Mr. Dunlap and his case, it was not enough. Of the 148 potential jurors who returned completed 
questionnaires, fifty-six (56) jurors were dismissed by stipulation of counsel based solely on their 
questionnaire responses. (R.32773, p.73l, Ex.O; 116/06 Tr., p.38, L.9 - pAO, L.13.) Though it 
would be reasonable to assume the remaining ninety-two (92) potential jurors were capable of 
being fair and impartial, that proved untrue; many jurors questioned in person admitted they had 
already decided Tim should die, even though their questionnaire answers failed to reflect such 
disqualification. (Compare 32773 Tr. Vol.2, p.84, Ls.14-21 with 32773 Tr. Vol.2, p.87, Ls.5-8; 
see 32773 Tr. Vol.2, p.1l8, Ls.5-6; Tr. Vol.2., p.120, Ls.2-4; Tr. Vol.2, p.I78, L.2 - p.l79, L.II; 
Tr. Vol.3, p.26, L.19 - p.27, L.4; Tr. Vol.3, pA2, L.I - p.43, L.23; Tr. Vol.3, p.53, Ls.2-5; Tr. 
Vol.3, p.62, L.6 - p.64, L.7; Tr. VolA, p.171, LsA-8.) 
A comparison between the questionnaire responses and live voir dire reveals how 
inadequate the questionnaires were in this regard. For example, in his questionnaire, alternate 
juror Chad Neibaur stated he had heard about Mr. Dunlap's case, but as to what he had heard, 
Mr. Neibaur wrote, "just at the time it happened"; when asked six pages later if he had read or 
heard anything about Mr. Dunlap's case, Mr. Neibaur said no. (R.32773, Ex.O (Neibaur 
4 A comparison of the State's proposed voir dire procedures with the court's order relating to 
voir dire reveals they are identical. (Compare R.32773, pp.570-73 (State's proposed voir dire) 
with R.32773, pp.602-03 and 327732/2/06 Tr., p.l, Ls.19-24; p.3, L.7 - p.6, L.12.) 
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Questionnaire), pp.20, 26.) During general voir dire, in response to the court's question 
regarding anything jurors may have heard about Mr. Dunlap's case, Mr. Neibaur simply said he 
was "familiar with it because it was in the county. It was in the county newspaper and other 
coverage." (32773 Tr. VoU, p.10, Ls.2l-23.) When asked if he knew anything else, 
Mr. Neibaur denied knowing more than what he had read fourteen years ago. (32773 Tr. VoU, 
p.10, L.24-p.1l, L.8.) 
During individual voir dire, Mr. Neibaur admitted knowing Mr. Dunlap had been 
sentenced in this case to death. (32773 Tr. Vol.2, p.90, Ls.19-22.) Trial counsel asked 
Mr. Neibaur: "As you sit there now, have you made up your mind from what you know about the 
case already as to whether you are going to vote the death penalty for Mr. Dunlap?" (32773 Tr. 
Vol.2, p.90, Ls.14-16.) In response, Mr. Neibaur stated he knew Mr. Dunlap had been sentenced 
to death by a judge and he was biased toward "following Judge's [sic] opinion." (32773 Tr. 
Vol.2, p.90, Ls.20-22.) Given Mr. Neibaur's voluntary disclosure during individual voir dire, it 
is apparent the questionnaire was not specific enough to elicit potential jurors' actual knowledge 
of the facts and circumstances surrounding Mr. Dunlap and his case. That deficiency was not 
cured by a mere five minutes of individual voir dire. 
The district court abused its discretion in adopting the State's unreasonable five minute 
limitation on individual voir dire, which prevented counsel from determining whether potential 
jurors were constitutionally qualified to serve on a capital sentencing jury. See Morgan v. 
Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729-34 (1992) (recognizing critical role voir dire plays in protecting the 
constitutional right to an impartial jury and thus limiting court's discretion to restrict voir dire to 
demands of fairness). The inadequacy of five minute individual voir dire in this case is evident 
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by the fact that the court repeatedly cut off defense counsels' questioning of potential jurors 
when the five minute limit was reached. (See, e.g., 32773 Tr. Vol.2, p.79, L.9; p.93, Ls.5-7; 
p.132, Ls.I-2; p.151, L.2; p.190, L.23; Vol.3, p.73, Ls.22-23.) Trial counsel were ineffective for 
failing to object to the court's rigid enforcement of the five minute limit against them, but not the 
State, and were similarly ineffective for failing to challenge the unreasonableness of the five 
minute limit, both generally and as applied to questioning of specific potential jurors. (R.37270, 
pp.794-99 & Attachs.) 
The insufficiency of voir dire in Mr. Dunlap's case is clear when information not elicited 
through jury questionnaires, general voir dire, and five minute individual voir dire, is compared 
with information elicited from potential jurors in post-conviction. For example, in his 
questionnaire, Corey Kunz admitted he had heard of Mr. Dunlap's case, knew Mr. Dunlap was 
just passing through and was not from Soda Springs, and he had been given an overview of the 
case from his neighbor, but maintained the information he had was limited enough to make him 
neutral. (See R.32773, Ex. ° (Corey Kunz questionnaire), pp.20, 24, 25-26.) When the jury panel 
was asked during general voir dire whether any of them knew anything about Mr. Dunlap's case 
aside from what was said in court, Mr. Kunz finally raised his hand, admitting that "I didn't raise 
my hand initially because I don't feel like I know anything about it, but I have heard hearsay 
around town." (32773 Tr. VoU, p.31, Ls.5-20.) Mr. Kunz was not asked and did not offer to 
explain during individual voir dire his specific knowledge of the facts of Mr. Dunlap's case or 
what he had heard around town about the case. (32773 Tr. Vol.2, p.120, L.10 - p.124, L.24.) 
However, when asked during the post-conviction investigation, Mr. Kunz admitted he knew 
before the resentencing trial that Mr. Dunlap had previously been sentenced to death in Idaho. 
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(See R.37270, p.I094, Pet'r's Ex. 512, Attach.18.) Again, this infonnation was not elicited 
through Mr. Kunz's questionnaire or voir dire answers, but only through post-conviction 
interviews. The same is true of seated juror Eric Christensen. In his post-conviction affidavit, 
Mr. Christensen admitted when he sat on Mr. Dunlap's jury, he already knew Mr. Dunlap had 
previously been convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in Idaho, even though 
this infonnation was never elicited through his questionnaire responses, general voir dire, or 
individual questioning. (See and compare R.37270, p.1094, Pet'r's Ex. 512, Attach. 23, p.1 with 
32773 Tr. Vo1.4, p.104, L.I - p.III, L.2.) 
For these reasons, the district court's deference to the State's five minute limit on voir 
dire was an abuse of discretion, it was unfair, and it denied Mr. Dunlap his constitutional and 
statutory right to a fair trial before an impartial jury. Trial counsels' failure to object to the 
unreasonable limitation deprived Mr. Dunlap of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective 
assistance of counsel and a fair trial before an impartial jury. The trial court's conclusion that 
trial counsels' efforts in voir dire were strategic choices by attorneys experienced in choosing 
juries is not supported by the record and does not address the substance of Mr. Dunlap's claim. 
Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Dunlap, the district court 
erred in summarily dismissing this claim. 
II. The District Court Abused Its Discretion And Denied Mr. Dunlap His Fifth, Sixth And 
Fourteenth Amendment Rights Under The United States Constitution And His Article 1, 
Sections 7 And 13 Rights Under The Idaho Constitution To A Trial Before A Fair And Impartial 
Jury When it Refused To Excuse Biased Jurors For Cause 
The State simply argues that because the challenged jurors, Mansfield and Mickelson, 
were removed by peremptory challenge and no jurors who actually sat were biased, there is no 
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error, or at least no hannfu1 error, in the district court's failure to remove these jurors for cause. 5 
(Resp. Br., p.9.) Mr. Dunlap relies on his original briefing, which is incorporated here by 
reference, and the additional argument herein. (Appellant's Br., pp.9-11; 37270 R., pp.803-05, 
1771-76.) 
The right of a criminal defendant to a fair trial before an impartial jury is protected by 
both the United States and Idaho Constitutions. U.S. CONST. amend. V (due process); U.S. 
CONST. amend VI (trial before an impartial jury); U.S. CONST. amend XIV (due process); IDAHO 
CONST. art. I, § 7 (jury trial), art. I, § 13 (due process). These constitutional rights are also 
embedded in Idaho Code Sections 19-1902, 19-2019, and 19-2020, and Idaho Criminal Rule 
(ICR) 24, which includes the right to peremptory challenges. 
In Mr. Dunlap's case, each party was entitled to twelve (12) peremptory challenges, with 
fifteen (15) jurors being seated, three (3) of whom would be alternates. (32773 1/6/06 Tr., p.lO, 
Ls.3-8; R.32773, pp.536, 631-32; I.C. § 19-2030; ICR 24( c ),( d)(l)l The manner and order in 
which peremptory challenges were exercised was not made part of the record by either the judge, 
the clerk of the court, or the court reporter, and whether the process violated Idaho Code Section 
19-2030 is thus unknown. 7 Who would be designated an alternate juror was not detennined until 
the conclusion of the case, when the clerk drew two names at random, identifying Forrest 
5 This is an assumption only; peremptory challenges, including who exercised them and against 
which potential jurors, are not part of the direct appeal record. 
6 One juror, Michelle Joy A1ver, was removed after it was discovered she had a number of 
conversations with a State's witness between the time she was selected and the time the jury 
began hearing evidence. 
7 Contrary to the State's and the district court's assertions, Mr. Dunlap did not pass the panel for 
cause. (32773 Tr. VolA, p.185, LsA-25.) 
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Hansen and Chad Neibaur as alternates. (32773 Tr. Vo1.12, p.84, L.25 - p.85, L.9; p.85, L.22 -
p.86, L.15.) These procedures were in accord with applicable Idaho Criminal Rules and statutory 
provisions. (ICR 24(c),(d)(1); I.C. § 19-2016; I.C. § 19-2030.) Only those individuals who are 
willing to impose the death penalty can become jurors in a capital case, thereby resulting in a 
jury that, as a matter of law, disfavors life and is thus stacked against the defendant. See, e.g., 
Witherspoon v. illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); Blume, Johnson & Threlkeld, Probing "Life 
Qualification" Through Expanded Voir Dire, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1209, 1209-48 (2001). 
When a district court en-oneously grants a State's for cause challenge to remove a 
potential juror inclined to give life, but simultaneously fails to exclude automatic death penalty 
jurors for cause, the court deprives a defendant of due process and his right to peremptory 
challenges, while granting the State the benefit of more peremptory challenges than it is entitled 
to, resulting in a jury even more predisposed to impose death. Here, the district court erroneously 
denied trial counsels' request to strike two jurors (Mickelson and Mansfield) for cause, which 
presumably resulted in counsel using peremptory challenges to prevent the obviously biased 
jurors from deliberating and deciding Mr. Dunlap's fate. Thus, Mr. Dunlap received only ten 
peremptory challenges, while the State received twelve. 
The district court's error in failing to exclude two jurors for cause at trial counsels' 
request was compounded by its erroneous exclusion of Juror McMinton for cause, which saved 
the State from having to use a peremptory challenge to eliminate her from the panel. 
Ms. McMinton indicated a willingness to consider mental health issues as mitigating evidence, 
said she would be willing to follow the law as stated by the judge even if she disagreed with it, 
but expressed the position that she did not think she could impose the death penalty if mental 
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illness were at issue. (32773 Tr. Vol.2, p.141, 1.6 - p.144, 1.10; R.32773 Ex. 0 (McMinton 
Questionnaire) pp.14, 17, 19 (expressing support for the death penalty); R.37270, pp.802-03, 
1766-70).). Trial counsel were denied the opportunity to ask further questions, and the court 
excluded Juror McMinton for cause based on the State's motion. 8 (32773 Tr. Vo1.2, p.144, 1.11 -
p.145,1.25.) 
While it is true that states are not required to provide peremptory challenges to protect a 
defendant's federal constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury, once a state chooses to do so, 
the procedures employed must comport with the demands of the Due Process Clause. Evitts v. 
Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,39. (1985). "When States provide peremptory challenges (as all do in some 
form), they confer a benefit beyond the minimum requirements of fair [jury] selection, and thus 
retain discretion to design and implement their own systems [ .]" Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U. S. 148, 
_, 129 S.Ct. 1446, 1454 (2010) (internal quotations & citations omitted). 
Peremptory challenges are a means of achieving an impartial jury and are "one of the 
most important of the rights secured to the accused." Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 89 (1988).9 
Peremptory challenges serve to "eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides" and "to assure 
parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence 
8 As the Supreme Court has held, "[A] sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that 
imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they 
voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples 
against its infliction." Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,522 (1968). 
9 The State's assertion that Ross governs Mr. Dunlap's claim is not true; Ross was premised on 
the fact that long-standing state law required the defendant to use peremptory challenges to cure 
a district court's erroneous refusal to excuse jurors for cause. 487 U.S. at 89-90. Thus, the court 
held "the requirement that the defendant use peremptory challenges to cure trial court errors is 
established by Oklahoma law, and petitioner received all that was due under Oklahoma law." Id. 
at 91. Idaho has no such requirement. 
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placed before them and not otherwise." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965), overruled 
on other grounds by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
The value of peremptory challenges is that they are intended and can be used 
when defense counsel cannot surmount the standard for a cause challenge. 
Requiring the defendant to show actual bias-the standard applicable to cause 
challenges-for the forced expenditure of a peremptory challenge renders the 
separate statutory grant of peremptory challenges totally meaningless. Such a 
construction also renders superfluous that aspect of section 913.03 which sets 
forth juror impartiality as grounds for a cause challenge, as the same showing 
would be required to vindicate the statutory right to exercise a peremptory 
challenge after a trial court has erroneously caused the loss of a peremptory 
challenge. Finally, the interpretation endorsed by the dissent would amplify the 
ability of one party to use peremptory challenges at the expense of the other in 
contravention of the plain language of section 913.08, which grants each party to 
a criminal proceeding the same number of peremptory challenges. Cf People v. 
LeFebre, 5 P.3d 295,304 (Colo.2000) (holding that state law requiring both sides 
to receive the same number of peremptories unless good cause is shown rendered 
the wrongful grant of a prosecutorial cause challenge a violation of the 
defendant's due process rights). Such interpretations directly undercut this Court's 
charge of interpreting statutes as a harmonious whole, giving effect to each of 
their constituent parts. See Acosta v. Richter, 671 So.2d 149, 153-54 (Fla.1996). 
While the deleterious consequences of the interpretation espoused by the dissent 
may not be readily apparent in a case involving one curative use of a peremptory 
strike, it comes into stark relief when one considers what might occur if the trial 
court were to wrongly, but not purposefully or intentionally, deny two or more 
cause challenges. In such instance, the defendant would be in the position of 
expending many, if not all, of the peremptories allotted to correct the trial court's 
errors, and consequently would be deprived of the entitlement to challenge those 
jurors whose voir dire answers reveal a real potential for bias, but who would 
otherwise not be subject to a challenge for cause. See Johnson v. State, 43 S.W.3d 
1, 6 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) ("If one of an accused's peremptory challenges could 
be taken away from him, why not five be taken, and if five, why not ten, leaving 
none, and all jurors be acceptable save unfair and partial ones.") (quoting Wolfe v. 
State, 147 Tex.Crim. 62, 178 S.W.2d 274,279-80 (1944)). Under such a scenario, 
a defendant would lose the ability to exercise peremptories as a separate and 
distinct class of challenges as provided under Florida law. Nothing in the 
jurisprudence of this Court, including our decisions requiring a defendant to 
expend curative peremptory challenges, supports such a result. 
Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 100 (Fla. 2004). 
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This Court has held that when a defendant alleges the district court erred in failing to 
remove a juror for cause based on actual and implied bias, where the challenged juror was left on 
the jury even though the defendant had failed to exercise all of his peremptory challenges, no 
reliefwas warranted on appeal. State v. Fondren, 24 Idaho 663, 135 P.265 (1913); see also State 
v. McMahon, 37 Idaho 737, 219 P.603 (1923) (no grounds for reversal of judgment where 
defendant exercised only three of his six peremptory challenges, "leaving the only inference to 
be drawn that the jury was entirely satisfactory"); State v. Van Vlack, 57 Idaho 316,65 P.2d 736 
(1937)( defendant's allegation on appeal that voir dire showed jurors were prejudiced against him 
not reviewed where defendant did not request change of venue and used only six of his ten 
peremptory challenges, informing the court "we are satisfied with the jury."), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. White, 93 Idaho 153,456 P.2d 797 (1969); but see State v. Ramos, 119 Idaho 
568, 569-70 (1991 ) (defendant's failure to show in motion for new trial that he was prejudiced 
by having to use peremptory to remove juror who should have been removed for cause, or show 
that any of the other jurors on the panel were not impartial or were biased, rendered error 
harmless). 
Mr. Dunlap should not be punished for using his peremptory challenges to try to remedy 
the district court's erroneous denial of his two for-cause challenges, and thereby reducing the 
additional prejudice and partiality that would have resulted by allowing Jurors Mickelsen and 
Mansfield to be impaneled. It would create a strange result indeed if Mr. Dunlap had rolled the 
dice and left the challenged jurors on the panel, they had deliberated and returned with a death 
verdict, and on appeal this Court granted him a new trial because two biased jurors took part in 
deliberations, yet he is entitled to no relief because he tried to mitigate the damage up front by 
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using his peremptories in an effort to fix the court's mistakes. Such a result cannot be justified, 
particularly where it renders the statutory right to peremptory challenges nugatory. 
Mr. Dunlap was deprived of his right to trial before a fair and impartial jury; instead, he 
received a trial before a partial jury shaped by the State, tilted to its favor and advantage. See 
People v. LeFebre, 5 P.3d 295,304 (Colo.2000)(holding state law requiring both sides to receive 
the same number of peremptories unless good cause is shown rendered the wrongful grant of a 
prosecutorial cause challenge a violation of the defendant's due process rights); Shane v. 
Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336, 339-40 (Ky.2008) (holding "[w]hen a defendant is forced to 
use a peremptory strike on a juror who has not been properly excused for cause, the court has 
actually taken away from the number of peremptories given to the defendant by rule of this 
CourtL],' and that failure violates a substantial right that can never be deemed harmless); 
Commonwealth v. Auguste, 305 N.E.2d 819, 823-24 (Mass. 1992) (reversible error when right to 
fair trial is violated by trial court's erroneous denial of for cause challenge requiring defendant to 
exhaust his peremptory challenges); State v. Good, 43 P.3d 948, 960 (Mont. 2002) (structural 
error for a trial court to deny a for cause challenge and defendant exhausts his peremptory 
challenges); Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 1334 (Utah 1993) (recognizing that allowing one 
side additional peremptories gives that party the unfair "opportunity to shape the jury to its 
advantage" and applying a presumption of prejudice when one side is granted too many 
peremptories); State v. Santelli, 621 A.2d 222, 224-25 (Vt. 1992) (rejecting argument that a 
defendant must show actual prejudice based on court's erroneous denial of a for cause challenge 
to get a new trial, because the court's errors "would become unreviewable because the focus of 
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the appellate inquiry would not be on the court's error but on the qualifications of the juror 
subject to the lost peremptory challenge."). 
Under these circumstances, the court's failure to excuse Jurors for cause who were 
automatic death penalty jurors, coupled with the court's erroneous exclusion of a juror for cause 
who was opposed to the death penalty in cases where mental illness was at issue but who agreed 
she could follow the law, deprived Mr. Dunlap of his right to twelve peremptory challenges and 
resulted in the impaneling of a jury predisposed to impose a death sentence. 
III. The District Court Erred In Giving Inadequate, Improper, Ambiguous, And Incorrect Jury 
Instructions Which Deprived Mr. Dunlap Of His Constitutional Right To A Fair Trial Under The 
Sixth And Fourteenth Amendments To The United States Constitution As Well As Article I, 
Sections 7 And 13 Of The Idaho Constitution 
The district court erred in giving inadequate, improper, ambiguous and incorrect jury 
instructions which deprived Mr. Dunlap of his constitutional right to a fair trial under the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, sections 7 and 13 of 
the Idaho Constitution. These instructional errors, as well as the State's Response to each, will be 
addressed separately. 
1. Felony Murder With Specific Intent Aggravator 
The instruction advising jurors that Mr. Dunlap had already pled guilty to first-degree 
murder, incorrectly stated the elements of felony-murder to which Mr. Dunlap pled. The 
instruction reduced the State's burden of proof with respect to the felony-murder with specific 
intent to kill aggravator by leading jurors to believe Mr. Dunlap's guilty plea satisfied the 
elements of the aggravator. 
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Other than a Perry challenge, the State's Response is limited to claiming that because this 
instruction was merely informational, and because jurors were advised that only evidence 
presented at the sentencing hearing could be considered, the instruction about Mr. Dunlap's 
guilty plea was not considered by jurors as evidence of the felony-murder aggravator. (Resp. Br., 
pp.1l-13.) The State's argument presumes jurors disregarded the court's advisement that 
Mr. Dunlap had already pled guilty to first-degree murder, and also disregarded the elements of 
the offense as the court defined them. (R.32773, Jury Instruction ("JI") No.1.) Contrary to the 
State's claim, jurors were explicitly told they were summoned to decide whether Mr. Dunlap 
should die, not whether he was guilty of first-degree; that had already been decided. (!d.) 
As this Court has acknowledged, the common definition of willful includes "an intention to 
commit the particular act." State v. Draper, No.34667, 2011 WL 4030069 (Idaho Supreme Court 
September 13, 2011). Thus, it must be assumed the jury construed "willfully" in Instruction 1 as 
intentionally. The jury was instructed that Mr. Dunlap pled guilty to first-degree murder, which 
was defined to the jury as "willfully, unlawfully and with malice aforethought, kill[ing] Tonya 
Crane[.]" Substituting "intentionally" for willfully in this instruction means the jury was told 
Mr. Dunlap pled guilty to intentionally killing Ms. Crane in the perpetration of a robbery. It is 
not clear what the jury had left to decide once they were instructed Mr. Dunlap had admitted, by 
his plea, to all elements of the felony-murder aggravator. The State claims even if erroneous, the 
instruction was harmless because Mr. Dunlap "confessed" to shooting Ms. Crane because she did 
not give him all the money, or "to teach her a lesson" for not giving him all the money. (Resp. 
Br., p.12.) Even if these statements were accepted as true, the intent to shoot someone is not the 
same as the intent to take someone's life. 
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Moreover, Mr. Dunlap made repeated statements at the time of the crime reflecting he shot 
Ms. Crane because she startled him, not because he wanted or intended to take her life. 
(R.32773, p.732 (State's Ex.lSb (10/16/91 police interview with Mr. Dunlap, p. 29 ("I didn't go 
in to kill anybody if that's what you mean .... It's the old saying when you spook somebody, the 
horse'll jump. She spooked me, .,. I didn't intend to kill her.") , p.65 ("I feel bad ... but it's 
something I had to do. Not had to do but I did it because she spooked me."), p.66 (when asked if 
he had it do over, what he would do, Mr. Dunlap responded, "I would do the same thing except 
she wouldn't get shot" and explaining he shot Ms. Crane because he was "spooked and the 
police coming and her not giving me all the money")); (State's Ex.lS(b) admitted at 32773 Tr. 
Vo1.6, p.l, L.1O - p.5, L.19; p.lS, L.l - p.24, LA); R.32773, p.732 (State's Ex.19b (10/17/91 
police interview with Mr. Dunlap, pp.50-51 (when asked if he felt he had to shoot Ms. Crane 
because she tripped the alarm, Mr. Dunlap interjected "and she spooked me")); (State's Ex. 19b 
admitted at 32773 Tr. Vo1.7, p.9, L.4 - p.12, L.20)).) 
That Mr. Dunlap lacked the specific intent to take Ms. Crane's life is further evidenced by his 
plea colloquy with the district court, wherein he refused to admit to shooting Ms. Crane with the 
intent to take her life, but would only admit that he killed her during a robbery. (1992S 12/30/91 
Tr., p.22, L.13 - p.23, L.16; R.1992S, pp.67, 117-1S.) Under these circumstances, the incorrect 
definition of felony-murder misled the jury into believing by virtue of his guilty plea, 
Mr. Dunlap had admitted the felony-murder aggravator, thereby decreasing the State's burden of 
proof; as a result, this aggravator cannot be relied upon to uphold Mr. Dunlap's death sentence. 
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2. Failure to Define Sufficiently Compelling 
The district court erred by failing to provide the jury with a definition of "sufficiently 
compelling" or to instruct the jury consistent with Idaho law regarding the weighing process. 
That error tainted the entire sentencing proceeding and renders the result umeliable. In its 
Response, the State simply argues that "sufficiently compelling" is an ordinary phrase requiring 
no further definition, without acknowledging long-standing Idaho law which has assigned a 
specific burden to the weighing process which could not be gleaned from the language of 
"sufficiently compelling to make imposition of the death penalty unjust" or "mitigating 
circumstances do not make imposition of the death penalty unjust." (Resp. Br., pp.13-14.) 
In Idaho, a defendant may not be sentenced to death unless each individual aggravating 
circumstance found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt outweighs the cumulative mitigation. 
State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 308-09 (1998) (each aggravator must outweigh the cumulative 
mitigation to impose death under the "sufficiently compelling" language). The district court's 
failure to instruct jurors to apply this standard, the only correct standard for weighing the 
cumulative mitigating evidence against each aggravator, violated Mr. Dunlap's Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial, rendering the jury's sentencing verdict umeliable. There is simply 
no way to determine what standard the jury applied in deciding that the mitigating evidence was 
not sufficiently compelling to render imposition of death unjust. As a result, the sentencing 
findings are umeliable and must be vacated. 
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3. Independent Evidence For Each Aggravator 
Recognizing unambiguous case law establishes the same evidence, without more, cannot be 
used to support more than one aggravator, the State simply argues that Mr. Dunlap is not entitled 
to relief because he has not raised a constitutional question under Perry. For the reasons set forth 
above, Perry does not apply. Mr. Dunlap's jury was never told it could not rely on the same 
evidence, without more, to find each aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of 
such an instruction and without written findings demonstrating which evidence the jury relied 
upon to find each individual aggravator, the only thing we know for sure is that the evidence 
could support one aggravator, but not all aggravators; we do not know which specific aggravator 
can be supported by the evidence. As a result, none of the aggravators can be relied upon to 
support the death sentence. The State cites State v. Sivak, 127 Idaho 387, 392 (1995) for the 
proposition that even if jurors double-counted the evidence to support the three aggravators 
alleged, "it would have no effect on the ultimate imposition of the death penalty." The State fails 
to explain that in Sivak, the court premised the imposition of a death sentence upon four different 
aggravating factors, but the defendant only challenged two on appeal. Id. Under such 
circumstances, where each aggravator would independently support the death sentence and the 
defendant challenged only two of the four aggravators as having been based on the exact same 
evidence, finding two aggravators invalid would not change the defendant's death sentence on 
the two unchallenged aggravators. Id. Here, Mr. Dunlap maintains that all aggravators in his case 
are invalid or are based on the same evidence. As a result, Mr. Dunlap's sentence would change 
if the challenged aggravators were set aside. Thus, the absence of an instruction prohibiting the 
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jury from relying on the same evidence, without more, to support multiple aggravators, renders 
Mr. Dunlap's death sentence invalid. 
4. Written Findings 
Written findings are the only way this Court can conduct its statutorily mandated sentencing 
review in capital cases to ensure that a death sentence is not imposed in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner, and to determine whether the jury relied on the same evidence to find more 
than one aggravator. The State simply asserts Mr. Dunlap's argument should be rejected because 
the Supreme Court, in a pre-Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) decision, rejected a similar 
argument by a defendant who claimed the state appellate court could not perform its proper role 
without written jury findings regarding mitigating circumstances. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 
494 U.S. 738, 750-51 (1990). Clemons was decided before the Supreme Court held that 
aggravating circumstances were the functional equivalent of elements of a greater offense, which 
had to be found by a jury in accordance with the Sixth Amendment. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609. 
Moreover, in Idaho, each individual aggravator is evaluated against all mitigating evidence 
whereas in a true weighing state, all aggravators are cumulatively weighed against all mitigating 
evidence. In the wake of Ring, it is difficult to discern how an appellate court could conduct such 
reweighing without jury findings regarding both evidence relied upon to find aggravators and 
mitigating circumstances. Such an analysis has no application in Idaho; if an aggravator is 
deemed unreliable or unconstitutional, it cannot be relied on to support a death sentence. Sivak, 
127 Idaho at 392. 
24 
5. Utter Disregard 
Assuming this aggravator is not unconstitutional, the utter disregard instruction given to 
Mr. Dunlap's jury was confusing, internally inconsistent, and failed to properly inform the jury 
what facts the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt before it could find the utter 
disregard aggravators. The Respondent's Brief does not warrant a further response. (See 
Appellant's Br., pp.1S-19; but see State v. Carson, No.33229, 2011 WL 529970S (Idaho 
Supreme Court November 2, 2011) (noting that because the defendant was not sentenced to 
death, the Court had to only consider whether the instruction was an accurate statement of the 
statutory aggravating circumstances, not whether it met the Supreme Court's requirements for 
the imposition of the death penalty). 
IV. Jurors' Knowledge That Mr. Dunlap Had Previously Been Sentenced To Death For The 
Same Crime Impermissibly Diminished Their Sense Of Responsibility In Imposing Death, In 
Violation Of The Eighth Amendment And Trial Counsel Were Ineffective In Failing To 
Discover Jurors' Knowledge OfMr. Dunlap's Prior Sentence And In Eliciting His Prior 
Sentence During Trial 
Jurors' knowledge that Mr. Dunlap had previously been sentenced to death in this case, 
impermissibly lowered the jurors' responsibility in deciding the sentence and decreased the 
reliability of that determination. Trial counsel were ineffective in failing to discover jurors' 
knowledge of Mr. Dunlap's prior death sentence in this case, and in failing to prevent 
information about the prior sentence being disclosed to the jury. The State incorrectly argues 
jurors' knowledge of Mr. Dunlap's prior death sentence in this case stemmed only from 
Dr. Cunningham's statements referencing Mr. Dunlap being housed on death row; the State fails 
to acknowledge other trial testimony regarding Mr. Dunlap being on death row, as well as some 
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jurors' pretrial knowledge of Mr. Dunlap's prior death sentence in this case. (32773 Tr. Vo1.2, 
p.90, Ls.19-22; Tr. VoUl, p.139, LsA-7; p.90, L.22 - p.91, L.2; p.91, L.23 - p.92, L.l; p.93, 
L.13 - p.95, L.12; p.98, Ls.1-21; R.37270, p.1094, Pet'r's Ex.512, Attachs. 18,23.) 
The State reiterates its Perry argument that this claim was not preserved and then argues 
the claim is precluded by Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994). The State's reliance on 
Romano is misplaced. In Romano, the Court concluded admission of evidence of Romano's prior 
death sentence in a different case did not affirmatively mislead the jury regarding its role in the 
sentencing process so as to diminish its sense of responsibility.lo fd. at 10. In contrast, in 
Mr. Dunlap's case, jurors' knowledge related to Mr. Dunlap having received a death sentence in 
the same case. 
The State cites to and relies upon cases which are similarly distinguishable from the facts 
of Mr. Dunlap's case. For example, two of the cases involved a single, isolated reference to the 
defendant being on death row or to his death sentence, either by a prosecutor in closing argument 
or a potential juror during voir dire. Muniz v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 214, 223 (5th Cir. 1998); State v. 
Simonsen, 986 P.2d 566, 570 (Or. 1999). In another case, jurors were not informed of the 
defendant's prior death sentence, but only that he was housed on death row, which was not error 
where jurors already knew the defendant had been convicted of capital crimes. King v. 
Mississippi, 960 S.2d 413, 433-34 (Miss. 2007). The State's reliance on State v. Gales, 694 
10 Notably, on direct appeal, the state court struck the prior violent felony aggravator, which was 
based solely on Romano's prior conviction and death sentence in a different case, because the 
conviction had been vacated. Romano, 512 U.S. at 11. 
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N.W.2d 124, 156 (Neb.2005),1l for the proposition that Romano applies to jurors' knowledge of 
the defendant's prior death sentence in the same case, is similarly misplaced. In Gales, the 
defendant simply claimed on appeal that jurors probably knew of his prior death sentence and 
such probable knowledge rendered his sentencing fundamentally unfair; actual knowledge was 
not substantiated by the record, but even if it had been, the Court concluded jurors would not 
have been able to have given effect to that knowledge, based on instructions they received. 
In the only relevant case cited by the State, the district court failed to excuse a potential 
juror for cause when the juror revealed she was aware of the defendant's prior death sentence. 
State v. Jaynes, 549 S.E.2d 179 (N.C. 2001). The North Carolina Supreme Court found no error 
in the failure to excuse the potential juror, observing that excusal was not mandatory where the 
trial court had reasonably concluded the potential juror could disregard her prior knowledge and 
impressions, follow the court's instructions, and render an impartial, independent decision based 
on the evidence. Jaynes is inapposite, however, because it involved a potential juror who was 
actually questioned about her knowledge of the defendant's prior death sentence; there is no 
indication that she actually sat and deliberated in the defendant's case. In contrast, at least one 
juror who knew Mr. Dunlap had previously been sentenced to death in this case was not 
questioned about his knowledge and deliberated in Mr. Dunlap's case. (Compare 32773 Tr. 
Vo1.2, p.l20, 1.10 - p.l24, 1.24.; R.37270, p.l094, Pet'r's Ex.512, Attach. 18.) 
Such knowledge impermissibly reduces jurors' sense of responsibility and undermines 
the reliability of their decision to grant or take life. This is particularly true when jurors know 
11 The State incorrectly cites this case as 443 N.W.2d 124, 156 (Neb. 2005)(Resp. Br., p.26; see 
also R.37270, p.1573.) 
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that a prior death sentence was imposed by a judge; it is not unreasonable to infer jurors would 
accord even more deference and weight to a prior death sentence which was imposed by a law-
trained judge than they would to such a sentence imposed by a jury. 
V. Mr. Dunlap's Rights To A Fair And Impartial Jury Pursuant To The Sixth And Fourteenth 
Amendments To The United States Constitution As Well As Article I, Sections 7 And 13 Of The 
Idaho Constitution, Were Violated By The District Court's Failure To Sequester The Jury 
Throughout The Special Sentencing Proceeding 
The State argues because Mr. Dunlap did not object to the Court's failure to sequester the 
jury, this claim has not been preserved for appeal and the error is not plain. The State further 
maintains that Mr. Dunlap's reading of the sequestration statute, Idaho Code Section 19-2126, is 
not clearly established and the statute is ambiguous. 12 In relevant part, the sequestration statute 
requires that "in causes where the defendant has been charged with first-degree murder, and the 
prosecuting attorney has filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty pursuant to section 18-
4004A, Idaho Code, and such notice has not been withdrawn, the jury may not be permitted to 
separate after submission of the cause and completion of the special sentencing proceeding 
held pursuant to section 19-2515 or 19-2515A, Idaho Code." I.e. § 19-2126 (emphasis 
added). Assuming the State is correct and this language is ambiguous, when statutory language 
is ambiguous and subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, this Court has to discern 
12 The State also claims "counsel may have had tactical reasons for not wanting the jury 
sequestered during all of the resentencing hearing." (Resp. Br., p.21.) At least one of Mr. 
Dunlap's trial attorneys testified that once the change of venue motion was denied, he knew Mr. 
Dunlap would get a death sentence because of the extreme prejudice against Mr. Dunlap in the 
Caribou County and Soda Springs communities. (R.37270, p.194, Ex. 512, Attach.3, p.78, L.24-
p.79, L.l; p.80, L.I0.) It is not clear what tactical or strategic reason could possibly exist for 
wanting jurors to be free to engage other community members where the community was so 
hostile to Mr. Dunlap. 
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and implement the legislative intent by reviewing the plain language of the statute, the public 
policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. Gonzalez v. Thacker, 148 Idaho 879, 881 
(2008). 
Revision of the sequestration statute was occasioned by the Supreme Court's decision in 
Ring, which rendered Idaho's death penalty scheme unconstitutional. According to Minutes of 
testimony before the Idaho Senate Judiciary and Rules Committee on January 17, 2003, 
opposing counsel advised the Committee that in capital cases, 
and it only refers to Capitol [ sic] cases, the jury shall be sequestered at the time 
that the case is submitted. That means that once closing arguments are completed, 
and the jury is to go back to the foreman [ sic] and make a determination of guilt 
and innocence, that they are sequestered at that time. It would be a violation of 
that statute if the jury were allowed to go home in between the determination of 
guilt and the sentencing hearing and the determination of the ultimate sentence. 
The case has already been submitted to them once, and it needed to be clarified 
that during that period of time, when the guilt phase has been submitted, that the 
jury is sequestered until they render their verdict, not only as to guilt, but as to the 
ultimate penalty in the case. In addition to make sure that is clear, it will eliminate 
the possibility that a friend or family member would lobby the juror. 
(Sen. Judiciary and Rules Comm. Meeting Minutes, 1117/03, SBIOOl, p.9 (Lamont Anderson); 
R.37270, Pet'r's Ex.SI8, Ex. I.) It does not appear any other testimony was offered regarding the 
sequestration statute, and it does not appear that any comment was made by any House or Senate 
members about the revision. Thus, these comments appear to be the only history associated with 
the 2003 amendment which added the language at issue in Mr. Dunlap's case. 
It seems apparent from the limited history associated with the amendment to the 
sequestration statute that the intent was to ensure jurors would be sequestered from the time they 
retired to deliberate after closing arguments in the guilt phase, until they reached a sentencing 
verdict. In Mr. Dunlap's case, the fact that the guilt phase had already been completed by virtue 
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of Mr. Dunlap's guilty plea did not eliminate the intent behind the statute to ensure that a capital 
jury's verdict be reached based on evidence presented at the sentencing, free from outside 
influence. Specifically, it makes no sense why jurors who deliberate in the guilt phase of a 
capital trial need to be sequestered from the time the case is submitted to them in the guilt phase, 
until they reach a sentencing verdict, but those jurors who are convened solely to decide whether 
a defendant should live or die, would be treated differently. The same concerns apply to both. 
As previously noted, a week passed between the time jurors were sworn and the time they 
actually returned to the courthouse to begin hearing evidence. During that week recess, we know 
at least one seated juror had conversations with a State's witness and had to be excused, despite 
the clear and repeated admonishments from the Court to the contrary. Moreover, prior to retiring 
to deliberate, a juror was overheard talking on his cell phone about the case, but no inquiry of 
this juror was conducted to determine the nature of the conversation. (R.37270 Renewed Mot. 
For Complete Tr., 2/22/06, p.1, L.8 - p.3, L.6; 32773 Tr. Vo1.l2, p.88, L.8 - p.90, L.9.) 
Mr. Dunlap has made a prima facie showing that his jury separated in violation of the 
statute and the State has failed to prove clearly and beyond a reasonable doubt nothing transpired 
during or on account of the separation that did or could prejudice Mr. Dunlap. As a result, 
Mr. Dunlap is entitled to a new sentencing with a sequestered jury. 
IX. Numerous Acts Of Prose cut oria I Misconduct Deprived Mr. Dunlap Of A Fair Trial In 
Violation Of The Due Process Clause Of The Fourteenth Amendment And Article I, Section 13 
Of The Idaho Constitution 
The standards which govern prosecutorial misconduct are well-established and were 
adequately set forth in Mr. Dunlap's Appellant's Brief. (Appellant's Br., pp.28-36.) Each 
instance of prosecutorial misconduct will be addressed below separately. 
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Equating Life Or Death Sentencing Decision With Buying A Home Or Taking A Job: 
The State claims the prosecutor's equation of the gravity of the decision to take Mr. Dunlap's life 
with the decision to buy a house riddled with termites was merely the prosecutor's appeal to 
jurors to use their common sense in deliberations, not a definition of reasonable doubt. (Resp. 
Br., pp.31-32.) The State maintains that even if the prosecutor's statements related to reasonable 
doubt, the prosecutor's statements were not wrong. The State relies on a 1971 intermediate 
appellate court case from Maryland, Anderson v. State, 278 A.2d 439 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. 1971), 
for the proposition that "owning property is a most important affair and can be used to explain 
the concept of reasonable doubt." (Resp. Br., pp.32-33.) The State fails to mention that Anderson 
was implicitly disavowed by the same court, which found a reasonable doubt instruction 
equating reasonable doubt with evidence so convincing it would enable the jurors "to act on an 
important piece of business in your everyday life[,]" to be prejudicial plain error, necessitating 
reversal. Himple v. State, 647 A.2d 1240, 1242 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. 1994) ("[T]he balance of the 
instruction given above appears to equate the degree with which people make important 
decisions in their everyday life with the reasonable doubt standard. That is not an accurate 
comparison. "). 
The Court's reasonable doubt instruction did not cure the prosecutor's incorrect recitation 
of reasonable doubt. (R.32773, JI 4.) This instruction is hollow at best, simply advising jurors 
that reasonable doubt is not mere possible doubt or imaginary doubt, but "is the state of the case 
which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the 
jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, 
of the truth of the charge." (Jd.) There is nothing in the wording of this instruction that would 
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prevent jurors from applying the prosecutor's incorrect reasonable doubt definition to the 
evidence in Mr. Dunlap's case. Absent an instruction advising jurors that reasonable doubt is 
more than the doubt attendant to everyday life decisions, including taking a job, getting married, 
or buying a house, the jury was left with a constitutionally deficient reasonable doubt definition 
which demanded less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt to take Mr. Dunlap's life; 
Mr. Dunlap's death sentence must therefore be vacated. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 
281-82 (1993). 
Mitigating Evidence: When the prosecutor told jurors in openmg statement that no 
amount of mitigating evidence from Mr. Dunlap's past could outweigh "the callous disregard for 
human life when he killed Tonya Crane[,]" the prosecutor was hoping jurors would disregard the 
law, ignore mitigating evidence, and just give Mr. Dunlap death. The prosecutor did not 
admonish jurors to review the evidence, but simply told them that once they examined the 
evidence, they would return with a death sentence that reflected the "reality" that mitigating 
evidence was irrelevant and the law dictated a death sentence. These representations are untrue 
statements of the law. 
Nexus Between Mr. Dunlap's Mental Illness And Offenses. When the prosecutor 
repeatedly emphasized to jurors in closing argument that Mr. Dunlap failed to prove a 
connection between his mental illness and his crime, the prosecutor clearly misstated the law and 
asked the jury to apply an incorrect standard. The State's claim that the prosecutor merely 
sought, through his repeated references to an absence of connection between Mr. Dunlap's 
mental illness and his crimes, to let the jury consider the mental illness evidence either as 
mitigating or aggravating, and to diminish the "mitigating" nature of any mental health 
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testimony, is disingenuous. Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have deemed 
mental health evidence to be mitigating. State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 570 (2008) ("Yet, mental 
health evidence is relevant to mitigation even where there is not such a nexus [between mental 
health and the crimes committed]."); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 866 (1983) ("Nor has 
Georgia attached the 'aggravating' label to ... conduct that actually should militate in favor of a 
lesser penalty, such as perhaps the defendant's mental illness."). By repeated references to the 
absence of a nexus between Mr. Dunlap's mental illness and his crime, and his repeated assertion 
that Mr. Dunlap knew right from wrong (a guilt phase issue), the prosecutor sought to have the 
jury disregard Mr. Dunlap's mental health evidence as irrelevant and non-mitigating. Contrary to 
the prosecutor's assertions and the State's current protestations, mental health evidence is 
mitigation evidence. The prosecutor's claims to the contrary were obvious misstatements of 
clearly established law, by which the State sought to decrease its burden in obtaining a death 
verdict, while simultaneously increasing Mr. Dunlap's burden with respect to the amount and 
kind of mitigation evidence that would be necessary to secure a life verdict. 
Utter Disregard. A review of the Respondent's Brief on this point reveals a limited reply 
is necessary, but Mr. Dunlap otherwise relies upon his prior briefing on this subject. (Appellant's 
Br., pp.31-32.) It is worth pointing out that the State failed to address Mr. Dunlap's argument 
that, assuming "utter disregard" is a valid aggravator, the district court erred in refusing to allow 
counsel to provide the jury with facts and details of other first degree murder cases in Idaho that 
did not result in a death sentence. Such information was necessary for jurors to understand why, 
by comparison to other first degree murderers, Mr. Dunlap was not a cold-blooded, pitiless 
slayer. This failure, coupled with the prosecutor's representation that a "cold-blooded pitiless 
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slayer" was merely an example of what constitutes utter disregard, contributed to the jury's 
erroneous finding of utter disregard. The expansion of utter disregard beyond its narrowly 
tailored definition, barely approved by the United States Supreme Court under a judge-
sentencing regime, renders it unconstitutional. See State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 110 (1998) 
(Johnson, J., concurring) ("I am concerned that this Court's expansion of the scope given to this 
aggravating factor will undennine the carefully crafted meaning of this subsection upon which 
the Court has upheld its constitutionality."). 
Argument That Death Must Be Imposed. The prosecutor told jurors in closing that "for 
his actions on that day, Idaho law requires that his life be taken as well," and "the main reason 
that Tim Dunlap deserves the death penalty in this case is because Idaho law requires it." (32773 
Tr. Vo1.l2, p.34, Ls.1-20; p.51, Ls.l6-17.) These are untrue statements of the law. Idaho law 
never requires imposition of a death sentence, period. Mandatory death sentences have long been 
disavowed. Rohert v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 328 (1976). A death sentence may be imposed upon 
the finding of an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, but the law never requires it be 
imposed. These assertions allowed the jury to impose death based on an erroneous application of 
the law. 
Bolstering Testimony Of Dr. Matthews. The State repeatedly elicited testimony from 
Dr. Matthews vouching for the credibility of other non-testifying witnesses and assigning 
particular weight to specific pieces of evidence, all at the prosecutor's request. Although the 
State questions why this is alleged as another instance of prosecutorial misconduct, this Court 
recently affirmed that when a prosecutor asks a witness to give an opinion about the validity of 
another witness's testimony, the response is improper vouching testimony, and eliciting such 
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testimony IS prosecutorial misconduct. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 229 (2010). Such 
testimony is an improper invasion into the province of the jury. State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 
525 (2003); see Appellant's Br., pp.33-34. 
Extension Of "Continuing Threat To Society" To Free Society. The State claims the 
propensity to commit murder which will probably constitute a continuing threat to society 
aggravator is not, by its plain language, limited to prison society and that Mr. Dunlap has failed 
to cite to any authority requiring or allowing such a limitation. As previously explained, 
Mr. Dunlap has a death sentence in Ohio and even if he were to receive less than death in Idaho, 
he stipulated to a fixed life sentence in his plea agreement; Mr. Dunlap will never be in free 
society again. Even if Mr. Dunlap's conviction and sentence were vacated in Ohio, he will never 
be released in free society in the instant matter. 
In Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), the United States Supreme Court 
held that when a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing 
alternative to death is life without the possibility of parole (L WOP), a defendant has a due 
process right to inform the jury that he is parole ineligible. In Simmons, the sentencing statute 
permitted parole for certain capital defendants who were serving life sentences, but Simmons 
was ineligible because of prior convictions for crimes of violence. 512 U.S. at 156. When 
Simmons' jury sent a note to the judge mid-deliberations asking whether a life sentence carries a 
possibility of parole, the court advised jurors not to consider parole or parole eligibility. Jd. at 
160. The jury soon returned with a death verdict. Jd. The Supreme Court found because the 
judge's instruction could have left jurors with the impression that the defendant was parole 
35 
eligible, even though he was not, the instruction violated the defendant's due process right. Id. 
The Court reaffirmed this principle in Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 51 (2001). 
When the State alleges a capital defendant poses a risk of future danger, for the same 
reasons jurors must be informed that a fixed life sentence means there is no possibility of parole, 
jurors must be informed that future dangerousness must be assessed based on the reality of the 
defendant's environment. Mr. Dunlap stipulated to nothing less than a fixed life sentence in this 
case, despite the fact that such a sentence was not required at the time of his offense and plea; 
Mr. Dunlap also has a death sentence in Ohio. The truth is that the risk of Mr. Dunlap's future 
dangerousness, whether he probably constitutes a continuing threat to society, must be assessed 
based on the actual prison society in which he will live the rest of his life, not the mythical risk 
he would pose to free society. 
Like Simmons, the prosecutor in Mr. Dunlap's case told the jury this aggravator applied 
to fi'ee society, not prison society, and further told the jury that they had to consider 
Mr. Dunlap's continuing threat as "whether he would do it again if he was exposed to society." 
(32773 Tr. Vo1.l2, p.48, L.1 - p.49, L.6.) That this argument made a difference is borne out by 
the question submitted by the jury during deliberations asking the court what was meant by 
violence and society in this aggravator. (32773 Tr. Vo1.12, p.48, Ls.9-16; R.32773, pp.698-99.) 
The Supreme Court has long acknowledged that jurors are more inclined to impose death 
if they believe a defendant would or could ever be released into free society. Kelly v. South 
Carolina, 534 U.S. 246 (2002). Mr. Dunlap will never leave prison alive in the State of Idaho. 
Thus, the prosecutor's statements that society meant free society for purposes of assessing 
Mr. Dunlap's risk of future danger to society was false, misleading, and a denial of due process, 
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leading to the jury's finding of the aggravator that Mr. Dunlap constituted a continuing threat to 
society; as a result, this aggravator cannot be relied upon to support Mr. Dunlap's death sentence 
and must be vacated. 
XI. The District Court Erred In Refusing To Subject The State's Evidence In Aggravation 
To The Rules Of Evidence In Violation OfMr. Dunlap's Due Process And Fair Trial Rights, 
And Ex Post Facto 
A reVIew of the Respondent's Brief warrants a limited reply; Mr. Dunlap also 
incorporates by reference his prior briefing on this claim. (Appellant's Br., pp.37-40.) The State 
relies on State v. Jeppesen, 138 Idaho 71, 75 (2002), to support its argument that the rules of 
evidence, excepting privileges, do not apply to evidence presented at sentencing. This is an 
accurate but incomplete statement of the Jeppesen Court's pronouncement, which was premised 
on judge-sentencing in a non-capital case: "The sentencing judge is presumably able to ascertain 
the relevancy and reliability of the broad range of infonnation and material presented to it during 
the sentencing process and to disregard the irrelevant and unreliable." Id. 
Other cases cited by the State allowing the admission of evidence not subject to 
evidentiary rules or similar standards also arose in cases where a judge, not a jury, was charged 
with making the sentencing decision and presumably knew what infonnation was relevant and 
reliable, and would disregard the rest. See cf Williams v. New York, 37 U.S. 241, 250 (1949) 
(due process not violated where sentencing judge relied on evidence other than open court 
testimony and evidence to impose a death sentence); Creech v. Arave, 647 F.2d 273,880 (9th Cir. 
1991) (no confrontation clause violation where judge relied on PSI infonnation to impose death 
sentence but defendant had opportunity to rebut, deny or explain PSI infonnation: "The trial 
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judge at sentencing may appropriately conduct a broad inquiry largely unlimited as to the kind of 
information to be considered or the source of such information."). 
Mr. Dunlap maintains that when the decision maker is the jury, not a judge, the rules of 
evidence must be applied to evidence in aggravation, which must be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt and found unanimously. I.C. § 19-2515(3)(b). In contrast, the rules of evidence do not 
apply to mitigating evidence, which constitutionally cannot be restricted or limited. }v1cKoy v. 
North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 442 (l990)("The Constitution requires States to allow 
consideration of mitigating evidence in capital cases. Any barrier to such consideration must 
therefore fall."). The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected unanimity requirements for 
mitigating evidence precisely because such a requirement '''impermissibly limits jurors' 
consideration of mitigating evidence." Id. at 444. 
The Supreme Court's application of different standards to aggravating and mitigating 
evidence is constitutionally based, and was explained by the Supreme Court in Penry v. 
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 327-28 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304 (2002): 
In contrast to the carefully defined standards that must narrow a sentencer's 
discretion to impose the death sentence, the Constitution limits a State's ability to 
narrow a sentencer's discretion to consider relevant evidence that might cause it 
to decline to impose the death sentence. Indeed, it is precisely because the 
punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the defendant 
that the jury must be allowed to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence 
relevant to a defendant's character or record or the circumstances of the offense. 
Rather than creating the risk of an unguided emotional response, full 
consideration of evidence that mitigates against the death penalty is essential if 
the jury is to give a '''reasoned moral response to the defendant's background, 
character, and crime.'" In order to ensure "reliability in the determination that 
death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case," the jury must be able to 
consider and give effect to any mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant's 
background and character or the circumstances of the crime. 
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(Citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
Despite the State's protestations, this Court has acknowledged the effect of Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002), "was to convert statutory aggravating circumstances relevant 
to sentencing into 'the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,' which must be 
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.,,13 State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 387 (2010) 
(quotations and citations omitted). Once the sentencing decision was placed in the hands of 
jurors, capital sentencing was transformed into a proceeding more trial than sentencing and 
which bears little, if any, resemblance to judge sentencing. 
Application of the rules of evidence to evidence in aggravation would have precluded the 
admission and consideration of hearsay evidence, such as Mr. Doten's and Dr. Brooks' reports. 
See LR.E. 802, 803(23)(A). The admission of these repOlis was prejudicial because it allowed 
the jury to consider unreliable, misleading, and unchallenged evidence in determining the 
existence of aggravators, the strength of Mr. Dunlap's mitigation, and deciding Mr. Dunlap's 
fate. 
XII. The District Court Erred In Submitting The Utter Disregard Aggravator For The Jury's 
Consideration In Violation OfMr. Dunlap's Fifth, Sixth, And Fourteenth Amendment Rights 
Under The United States Constitution 
13 Presumably as the functional equivalent of elements of a greater offense, statutory aggravators 
must be charged by information or indictment, which was not done in Mr. Dunlap's case. 
(R.37270, pp.858-68; R.37270, p.1094, Pet'r's EX.SI2, Attach. 31.) Arguably, the absence of an 
indictment or information alleging the statutory aggravators deprived the district court and this 
Court of subject-matter jurisdiction. State v. Quintero, 141 Idaho 619, 621 (2005). Moreover, it 
is questionable whether notice filed under Idaho Code Section 18-4004A could substitute for an 
indictment or information where such notice imposes no burden of proof upon the State, or 
requirement of a factual basis for the alleged aggravators, whereas the State would otherwise 
shoulder the burden of presenting sufficient evidence to demonstrate probable cause to believe 
the defendant committed the aggravators alleged. State v. Stewart, 149 Idaho 383, 387 (2010). 
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The district court erred in submitting the utter disregard aggravator to the jury, in 
violation ofMr. Dunlap's Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The State argues that 
even though it failed to appeal the district court's refusal to impose a death sentence upon 
Mr. Dunlap based on the utter disregard aggravator, the law of the case did not preclude it from 
again seeking a death sentence based on this aggravator. (Resp. Br., pp.43-44.) Specifically, the 
State claims the United States Supreme Court decision in Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S.463 (1993), 
upholding the utter disregard aggravator and thereby reversing the Ninth Circuit's decision 
finding utter disregard to be unconstitutional, Creech v. A rave, 947 F.2d 873, 882 (9th Cir. 
1991)( en banc), was an intervening change in the law which precludes application of the law of 
the case. For the State's argument to be correct, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions must 
be binding on state courts; to the contrary, while state courts are bound by United States 
Supreme Court decisions, they are not bound by decisions of lower federal courts, even on issues 
of federal law. Dan Wiebold Ford, Inc. v. Universal Computer Consulting Holding, Inc., 142 
Idaho 235,240 (2005). There was no intervening change in the law and thus, the law of the case 
prevented the State from seeking a death sentence based on utter disregard. As a result, this 
aggravator cannot be relied upon to uphold Mr. Dunlap's death sentence. (See also R.37270, 
pp.1506-13.) 
XIII. The District Court Erred In Submitting The Utter Disregard Aggravator To The Jury 
Where The Aggravator Was Invalid Under A Jury Sentencing Scheme In Violation Of 
Mr. Dunlap's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth And Fourteenth Amendment Rights 
The district court erred in submitting the utter disregard aggravator to the jury where it is 
invalid in the context of jury sentencing, in violation of Mr. Dunlap's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and 
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Fourteenth Amendment Rights. The State claims Idaho's adherence to judge sentencing III 
capital cases was irrelevant to the Supreme Court's decision in Creech, upholding the utter 
disregard aggravator against a constitutional vagueness challenge. (Resp. Br., p.46.) The State is 
incorrect. 
Prior to Ring, the Supreme Court always took into consideration whether the sentencing 
body was a jury or judge when reviewing the constitutionality of aggravating factors. See, e.g., 
Espinoza v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992) (per curiam)(where sentencing jury relied on one 
unconstitutionally vague aggravator in recommending the trial court impose death, and the court 
did so and was required to give great weight to the jury recommendation, the trial court 
indirectly weighed the invalid aggravator and created the same potential for arbitrariness as the 
direct weighing of an invalid aggravator, rendering the sentencing invalid); Walton v. Arizona, 
497 U.S. 639 (1990)( especially heinous, cruel or depraved aggravator facially vague, but as 
interpreted by Arizona courts not unconstitutionally vague in context of judge sentencing where 
judges are presumed to know the law and apply it in making their decisions), overruled on other 
grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 
(1988)( especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance invalid in jury 
sentencing regime where jury was not provided with constitutional limiting definition and 
appellate court did not apply limiting definition to aggravator on review); Godfrey v. Georgia, 
446 U.S. 420 (1980) (invalidating aggravator that the murder be outrageously or wantonly vile, 
horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the 
victim, despite state court's adequate limiting definition of this phrase, where court's 
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interpretation was so broad it may have vitiated role of aggravating circumstance in guiding 
sentencing jury's discretion). 
This is particularly true when the utter disregard aggravator, much like the "especially 
heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity" aggravator, requires the sentencer 
to engage in a comparison of all first-degree murder defendants, and their crimes, to determine 
who among them satisfy the aggravator. If all offenders and all offenses fit this description, the 
aggravator has done nothing to narrow the sentencer's discretion and the aggravator is 
unconstitutional. This is precisely the problem with the utter disregard aggravator which, 
notably, only exists in Idaho; no other death penalty jurisdiction in this country utilizes utter 
disregard. (R.37270, pp.1532-33, & n.24.) 
XIV. The District Court Erred In Admitting The Reports Of Dave Doten And Dr. Brooks Which 
Contained Inadmissible Testimonial Statements In Violation Of The Confrontation Clause And 
By Admitting Dr. Brooks' Report And Portions Of Dr. Estess' s 1992 Report In Violation Of 
Mr. Dunlap's Due Process Rights, Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, And 
Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel, All Of Which Trial Counsel Ineffectively Failed To 
Prevent Or Object To 
The Confrontation Clause and Self-Incrimination/Right to Counsel aspects of this issue, 
as well as the State's responses, are addressed below separately. 
Confrontation Clause. The State claims the Confrontation Clause does not apply to 
capital sentencing hearings, and Mr. Dunlap has failed to identify any jurisdiction that has 
applied the Confrontation Clause to capital sentencing. To the contrary, a number of jurisdictions 
have concluded the Confrontation Clause applies to capital sentencings. Coble v. Dretke, 444 
FJd 345, 353-54 (5 th Cir. 2006); United States v. Cantellano, 430 FJd 1142, 1146 (11 th Cir. 
2005); United States v. Mills, 446 F.Supp.2d 1115,1123-31 (C.D. Cal. 2006); United States v. 
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Jordan, 357 F. Supp. 2d 889, 903 (E.D. Va 2005) (Confrontation clause applies to the eligibility 
phase of capital sentencing); Vankirk v. State, 2011 Ark. 428,*8-*10 (Ark. S. Ct. October l3, 
2011) (confrontation clause applies to all sentencings); State v. Ross, 849 A.2d 648 (Conn. 
2004); Rodgers v. State, 948 So.2d 655, 663 (Fla.2006), cert.denied, 552 U.S. 833 (2007); State 
v. Nobles, 584 S.E.2d 765 (N.C. 2003); Grant v. State, 58 P.3d 783, 797 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 
2002). 
At a minimum, the Confrontation Clause must apply to evidence relating to aggravating 
circumstances because the finding of an aggravator is necessary for the imposition of a death 
sentence. Without the finding of an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
presentation of mitigating evidence does not occur and the defendant has not been "selected" for 
the possibility of a death sentence. Because the reports of Mr. Doten and Dr. Brooks l4 were 
testimonial, they were admitted by the State (R.32773, p.733 (State's Exs.43, 44); 32733 Tr. 
VoU1, p.168, Ls.5-17), and relied upon to support the aggravating circumstances alleged, their 
admission violated the Confrontation Clause. 
Self-Incrimination and Right to Counsel. Undersigned counsel admits to inartfully 
phrasing this claim in a way that implied objectionable portions of Dr. Estess's 1992 report were 
admitted through Dr. Matthews' testimony (Appellant's Br., p.46), which is incorrect; such 
objectionable portions of Dr. Estess's 1992 report were admitted through Dr. Pettis's affidavit, 
while the objectionable report of Dr. Brooks was admitted through Dr. Matthews' testimony. 
14 It is all the more troubling that the report of Dr. Brooks admitted by the State and presented to 
the jury was not an original or clean copy, but instead was a version marked up by hand, with the 
most damning aspects of the report highlighted for the jury through underlining and an asterisk. 
(R.32773, p.733 (State's Ex.44).) 
43 
The State fails to acknowledge that Dr. Beaver testified to the contents of Dr. Brooks' 
report only upon cross-examination by the State; the content of Dr. Brooks' report was not 
elicited by trial counsel. Moreover, the State's allegation that trial counsel had a tactical reason 
to admit Dr. Pettis's unredacted affidavit containing the most prejudicial portions of Dr. Estess' s 
report is just that; an allegation. There is no tactical reason for counsel to want to admit this 
unredacted affidavit containing the highly prejudicial information from Dr. Estess for the jury's 
consideration; this unredacted affidavit adds little in the way of mitigation, and much in the way 
of prejudice. 
The State contends that because trial counsel knew the contents of the reports but 
nevertheless introduced or failed to object to their introduction into evidence, there was no Wood 
error. To the contrary, the fact that trial counsel knew substantial portions of Dr. Pettis's affidavit 
and Dr. Brooks' report were highly prejudicial to Mr. Dunlap makes their failure to object to 
their submission to the jury even worse than Souza's and Whittier's initial failure to object to 
disclosure of the reports to the State, not knowing their contents. Presumably the State would not 
have conceded Whittier and Souza's ineffectiveness and agreed to a new sentencing had 
Dr. Estess's report, and similar information contained in Dr. Brooks' report, been beneficial to 
Mr. Dunlap. Trial counsels' failure to prevent the admission of this highly prejudicial 
information violated Mr. Dunlap's right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination. 
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POST-CONVICTION ISSUES 
STANDARDS GOVERNING POST-CONVICTION CLAIMS 
A vast majority of Mr. Dunlap's post-conviction claims are based on the ineffective 
assistance he received from his trial counsel. The district court summarily dismissed every single 
one of Mr. Dunlap's post-conviction claims without a hearing. The standards governing post-
conviction and summary disposition are well-established. 
An application for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 
138 Idaho 76, 79-80, 57 P.3d 787, 790-91 (2002). Like a plaintiff in a civil action, 
the applicant for post-conviction relief must prove by a preponderance of evidence 
the allegations upon which the application for post-conviction relief is based. Id. 
The court may summarily dismiss a petition for relief when the court is satisfied 
the applicant is not entitled to relief and no purpose would be served by further 
proceedings. I.c. § 19-4906(b). However, disposition on the pleadings and record 
is not proper if there exists a material issue of fact. Id. If genuine issues of material 
fact exist that would entitle the applicant to relief, if resolved in the applicant's 
favor, summary disposition is improper and an evidentiary hearing must be 
conducted. Bergv. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998) (citations 
omitted) . 
. . . . Summary dismissal of a petition for post conviction relief is the procedural 
equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. Charboneau v. State, 140 
Idaho 789, 792,102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004). On review, the task of this Court "is 
to determine whether the appellant has alleged facts in his petition that if true, 
would entitle him to relief." Id. A court is required to accept the petitioner's 
unrebutted allegations as true, but need not accept the petitioner's conclusions. 
Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 321, 900 P.2d 795,797 (1995). 
Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153 (2008). 
For an application for post-conviction relief based on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel to survive a summary dismissal, the petitioner must establish 
that: (1) a material issue of fact exists as to whether counsel's performance was 
deficient; and (2) a material issue of fact exists as to whether the deficiency 
prejudiced the applicant's case. Gilpin-Grubb, 138 Idaho at 80, 57 P.3d at 791 ... , 
To establish deficient assistance, the burden is on the petitioner to show 
that his attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Ivey 
v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992). This objective standard 
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embraces a strong presumption that trial counsel was competent and diligent. 
Ivey, 123 Idaho at 80, 844 P.2d at 709. Thus, the claimant has the burden of 
showing that his attorney's performance fell below the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance. Berg, 131 Idaho at 520, 960 P.2d at 741. 
To establish prejudice, the claimant must show a reasonable probability 
that but for his attorney's deficient performance the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different. Berg, 131 Idaho at 520, 960 P.2d at 741 (citing Aragon 
v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988)). Trial counsel's strategic 
or tactical decisions will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions 
are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other 
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Gilpin-Grubb, 138 Idaho at 81, 57 
P.3d at 792. "When counsel's trial strategy decisions are made upon the basis of 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the applicable law, or other shortcomings 
capable of objective evaluation, the defendant may very well have been denied 
effective assistance of counsel." Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761,760 P.2d at 1177. 
Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153-54. 
Mr. Dunlap bears the burden of proving the facts underlying his post-conviction claims 
by a preponderance of the evidence, i.e., the deficiency of counsels' performance. To establish 
prejudice based on those facts, Mr. Dunlap must show that but for counsels' deficient 
performance, there is a reasonable probability the outcome of the proceeding would have been 
different, which requires less than proofby a preponderance of the evidence. Holland v. Jackson, 
542 U.S. 649, 654 (2004). 
1. The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Mr. Dunlap's Discovery Request For 
Access To The Crossbow And Shotgun For Expert Testing 
The district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Dunlap's discovery request for 
access to the crossbow and shotgun for testing by his expert. Testing of the shotgun trigger pull 
was necessary to rebut the felony-murder with the specific intent to kill and utter disregard for 
human life aggravators. Mr. Dunlap repeatedly denied he intended to kill Ms. Crane. (See supra 
Direct Appeal Issue III (3), pp.23-24.) Even in its opening statement, the State dismissed 
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Mr. Dunlap's explanations for unintentionally shooting Ms. Crane. (32773 Tr. VoL5, p.36, L.I8-
p.37, L.5 (prosecutor telling the jury that Mr. Dunlap told police he shot Ms. Crane because: she 
did not give him all the money, which was not true because there was no money in the drawer 
after he left; he thought she activated a security alarm, which was not true because there was no 
security alarm in the bank for her to activate; and because she somehow startled him).) 
If the State had not itself relied on trigger pull testing and testimony to support the 
aggravating circumstances alleged, its characterization of Mr. Dunlap's trigger pull testing as a 
fishing expedition would have greater merit. The State relies on Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 
602 (2001), to support the district court's refusal to allow Mr. Dunlap's expert to examine the 
trigger pull of the shotgun and crossbow. In Raudebaugh, the petitioner sought to have the 
murder weapon (knife) examined by an independent expert for fingerprints, as the State's expert 
had found none. 135 Idaho at 603. The petitioner supported his request by affidavits which 
included conclusory and speculative assertions of what testimony an independent expert might 
have provided at trial. Id. at 604-05. The district court summarily dismissed the petition without 
deciding the petitioner's discovery motion. Id. at 605. This Court affirmed the district court's 
decision, finding no abuse of discretion where the petitioner made "no showing that the state's 
testing was flawed or that there is new technology that would make current testing more 
reliable." Id. The State claims Mr. Dunlap's allegations about testing the trigger pull were 
similarly speculative and Mr. Dunlap had not shown that the State's testimony was flawed. The 
State is simply incorrect. 
Mr. Dunlap's expert, Gaylan Warren, explained in his affidavit why additional testing of 
the trigger pull of the shotgun was important, specifically addressing the disparities between the 
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results of the State's 1991 trigger pull testing and the testing done in 2005. (R.37270, pp.656-64, 
Pet'r's Ex. 509, Ex.B, pp.2-3.) Mr. Warren was particularly concerned about the reliability of the 
State's results because under normal testing conditions, "the variance should not exceed ~ 
pound[,]" but in Mr. Dunlap's case, the trigger pull testing revealed more than a one-pound 
difference. (Id.) Specifically, the five (5) trigger pull tests conducted in 1991 by the State's 
experts yielded multiple results: 7 114 pounds, 7 5i8 pounds, 7 pounds, 7 pounds, and finally 7 
7/8 pounds. (Id.) In contrast, by 2005, the State's expert testified trigger pull testing of the same 
shotgun revealed a 6 % pound trigger pull. (Id.) Mr. Warren also addressed how trigger pull 
testing of the crossbow was important given Mr. Dunlap's statements about having limited 
expenence with guns, his more recent experience with the crossbow, and how that recent 
expenence with the crossbow and its higher trigger pull weight would lend support to 
Mr. Dunlap's claim that he fired the shotgun accidentally after being startled by Ms. Crane. (Jd.) 
Given the circumstances in this case, where Mr. Dunlap made repeated statements about 
shooting Ms. Crane because he was startled or spooked, not because he intended to kill her, and 
where Mr. Dunlap's expert in post-conviction explained why the State's testing results were 
likely flawed, the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant Mr. Dunlap's request to 
have the shotgun and crossbow tested. 
III. The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Dunlap's Claim That 
The State Committed Numerous Brady And Napue Violations In Violation Of The Due Process 
Clause Of The Fourteenth Amendment 
The extent of the district court's analysis of the State's Brady and Napue violations, as 
thoroughly briefed and supported by Mr. Dunlap (R.37270, p.l094, Pet'r's Ex.512, Attachs.84-
97; R.37270, p.1872, Pet'r's Ex.518, Exs.16, 20), is approximately one page, double-spaced. 
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(R.37270, pp.1996-97.) In essence, the district court concluded that despite Mr. Dunlap's 
presentation of evidence demonstrating at least prima facie proof that the State knew Mr. Dunlap 
was mentally ill prior to the jury sentencing, because "the summary judgment pleading [in 
Mr. Dunlap's civil rights case] was filed after Dunlap's resentencing[,] [t]he State should not be 
held responsible for information that was not known or developed until resentencing had been 
completed." (R.37270, p.1997.) In its response, the State adopts this reasoning wholesale. (Resp. 
Br., pp.61-66.) 
The State focuses on the affidavit of Mr. Dunlap's investigator referencing the 
investigator's conversations with relevant State actors about their knowledge of Mr. Dunlap's 
mental illness, when they gained that knowledge, and to which State actors that information was 
conveyed. (R.37270, p.1872, Pet'r's EX.5I8, Ex.16.) The State argues this affidavit is hearsay 
and cannot be relied upon, but fails to explain how the affidavit does not fall within the purview 
of Idaho Code Section 19-4903, which provides that "[a]ffidavits, records, or other evidence 
supporting its allegations shall be attached to the application or the application shall recite why 
they are not attached." Mr. Dunlap documented his efforts to obtain the information through 
other sources, including State actors, who were either unresponsive or who had no recollection of 
when contacts occurred. (R.37270, pp.1864-70; R.37270, p.1872, Pet'r's Ex. 518, Ex.I6.) 
More importantly, both the district court and the State have completely ignored the 
belated public record request response undersigned counsel received from the Department of 
Correction, Criminal Law Division, of the Idaho Attorney General's Office. That belated 
response was received by undersigned counsel on May 6, 2009, and was attached to the 
Response to Brief in Support of Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal as Exhibit 20 
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(hereinafter "Exhibit 20"), filed May 7, 2009. (R.37270, p.I867, n.2 & p.1872, Pet'r's Ex.5I8, 
Ex.20.) 
Mr. Dunlap's jury sentencing commenced on February 6, 2006, and concluded with a 
verdict on February 22, 2006. The State was represented both pretrial and throughout the 
sentencing proceeding by Deputy Attorney Generals Ken Robins and Justin Whatcott, while 
Deputy Attorney General William Loomis represented the State in defending against 
Mr. Dunlap's federal civil rights lawsuit. 
According to Exhibit 20 documents, Deputy Loomis had contact with Dr. Sombke about 
Mr. Dunlap via email on January 31,2005 and February 1, 2005. The two also had a telephone 
conversation about Mr. Dunlap on February 1,2005. (R.37270, p.I872, Pet'r's Ex.518, EX.20, 
5/5/09 Letter, p.I, Item 3.) Dr. Sombke was the Chief Psychologist at IMSI who treated 
Mr. Dunlap, detennined he had a psychiatric illness requiring treatment, and concluded housing 
him in the mental health unit rather than general population was necessary because of his mental 
illness. (R.37270, p.1094, Pet'r's Ex.5I2, Attach.95.) Dr. Sombke's email to Deputy Loomis on 
January 31, 2005 reflects he told Deputy Loomis that "C-block Tier 2 is for the stable mentally 
ill and Mr. Dunlap would fit that category." (R.37270, p.I872, Pet'r's EX.518, Ex.20, 1/31/05 
Email from Dr. Sombke to Deputy Loomis (emphasis added).) 
Gregory Fisher, IMSI warden from July 1, 2001 until July 1, 2005, was copied on these 
emails. (Id., Ex. 20.) Mr. Fisher and Deputy Loomis also corresponded via email on February 2, 
2005 about Mr. Dunlap, and Dr. Sombke was copied on that email, but the content of the contact 
is unknown, having been completely redacted by Deputy Panther. (Id., EX.20, 2/2/05 Email from 
Mr. Fisher to Deputy Loomis.) Deputy Loomis and Mr. Fisher had a lengthy conversation about 
50 
Mr. Dunlap on February 2, 2005, but the content is unknown, as the notes relating to that 
conversation were completely redacted by Deputy Panther. (Jd., Ex. 20, 212105 Deputy Loomis 
notes re: conversation with Mr. Fisher.) 
Deputy Loomis contacted Deputy Robins on January 9, 2006, about Mr. Dunlap, but the 
content of the conversation is unknown, as the note was completely redacted by Deputy Panther. 
(Id., Ex. 20, 119/06 note.) Deputy Loomis and Deputy Robins also corresponded via email about 
Mr. Dunlap on January 12, 2006, February 17, 2006, and February 24, 2006. (Jd., Ex. 20, 
1112106 email from Deputy Loomis to Deputy Robins; 2117/06 Email from Deputy Loomis to 
Deputy Robins re "timmy dunlap"; 2124/06 Email from Deputy Robins to Deputy Loomis.) 
Again, the content of the correspondence is unknown, as the emails were completely redacted by 
Deputy Panther. 
It is unclear how this evidence fails to demonstrate the State knew in advance of 
Mr. Dunlap's jury sentencing that Mr. Dunlap was mentally ill and not malingering. Moreover, 
while the State is correct that psychiatry is not an exact science and psychiatrists can disagree 
about appropriate diagnoses, the fact that IMSI officials and the Chief of Psychiatry for IMSI all 
believed Mr. Dunlap was mentally ill, and as result of his mental illness, could not be housed in 
general population was exculpatory evidence, and at a minimum, impeachment evidence that 
would undermine Dr. Matthews' contrary opinion and thus his credibility. United State v. Agurs, 
427 U.S. 97 (1976); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). 
Prosecutors may neither elicit false evidence or testimony from witnesses, nor allow false 
evidence or testimony to go uncorrected. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (citations 
omitted); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (due process not satisfied by notice and 
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hearing where State has obtained a conviction through pretense of a fair trial which is actually a 
deliberate deception of the court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured). 
Impeachment evidence is material evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). Brady 
requires prosecutors to disclose evidence that could be used to impeach government witnesses on 
the basis of bias or interest, because such evidence is favorable to the accused and if used 
correctly, it can mean the difference between a conviction and acquittal. Id. at 676. "The 
evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed 
to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Jd. at 682. 
In Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), the Supreme Court sought to clarify its 
precedent regarding the disclosure of exculpatory evidence: 
Although the constitutional duty is triggered by the potential impact of favorable 
but undisclosed evidence, a showing of materiality does not require demonstration 
by a preponderance that disclosure would have resulted ultimately in the 
defendant's acquittal (whether based on the presence of reasonable doubt or 
acceptance of any explanation for the crime that does not inculpate the 
defendant) .... The question is not whether the defendant would more likely 
than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in 
its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict 
worthy of confidence. 
While the definition of Bagley materiality in terms of the cumulative 
effect of suppression must accordingly be seen as leaving the government with a 
degree of discretion, it must also be understood as imposing a corresponding 
burden. On the one side, showing that the prosecution knew of an item of 
favorable evidence unknown to the defense does not amount to a Brady violation, 
without more. But the prosecution, which alone can know what is undisclosed, 
must be assigned the consequent responsibility to gauge the likely net effect of all 
such evidence and make disclosure when the point of "reasonable probability" is 
reached. This in turn means that the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of 
any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf 
in the case, including the police. . .. [T]he prosecution's responsibility for 
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failing to disclose knowing favorable evidence nsmg to a material level of 
importance is inescapable. 
Id. at 434-38 (emphasis added). 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently explained the difference between impeachment 
evidence and substantive evidence: 
Unlike substantive evidence which is offered for the purpose of 
persuading the trier of fact as to the truth of a proposition on which 
the detennination of the tribunal is to be asked, impeachment is 
that which is designed to discredit a witness, i.e. to reduce the 
effectiveness of his testimony by bringing forth the evidence which 
explains why the jury should not put faith in him or his testimony. 
Examples of impeachment would include prior inconsistent 
statements, bias, attacks on [the] character of a witness, prior 
felony convictions, and attacks on the capacity of the witness to 
observe, recall or relate. Evidence may be both substantive and 
impeaching. 
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 74 (2011)(citations omitted); see also I.C. § 9-201 ("[I]n every 
case the credibility of the witness may be drawn in question, ... by evidence affecting his 
character for truth, honesty or integrity, or his motives, or by contradictory evidence; and the jury 
are the exclusive judges of his credibility."). The State's knowledge of Mr. Dunlap's mental 
illness is both material impeachment evidence and material substantive evidence which the State 
was obligated to disclose. The importance of evidence demonstrating State actors---the warden, 
the prison psychologist, attorneys in the criminal division of the Idaho Attorney General's office-
--all believed Mr. Dunlap was mentally ill and not malingering, and housed him accordingly, 
substantially undennines Dr. Matthews' opinions to the contrary, while lending support to 
Dr. Beaver's testimony and opinions that Mr. Dunlap is mentally ill. 
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At a minimum, the district court abused its discretion in summarily dismissing this claim 
in the State's favor, when this claim should have resulted either in an evidentiary hearing, or in a 
grant of summary relief in Mr. Dunlap's favor, and thus a new sentencing. 
N. The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Dunlap's Claim That Trial Counsel 
Were Ineffective In Violation Of The Sixth Amendment To The United States Constitution In 
Failing To Adequately Challenge Venue 
The district court erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Dunlap's claim that his trial counsel 
were ineffective in failing to adequately challenge venue. (Appellant's Br., pp.66-69; supra 
Direct Appeal, Claim I, pp.8-I2; R.37270, pp.773-86.) Mr. Parmenter's belief that counsel were 
dealing with a "fairly open-minded bunch" of jurors was simply unreasonable, and was not a 
view shared by his co-counsel, Mr. Archibald. Mr. Archibald testified once the change of venue 
motion was denied, he knew Mr. Dunlap was going to be sentenced to death based on the 
extreme prejudice against him in the Caribou County and Soda Springs communities. (37270 R., 
p.1094, Pet'r's Ex.5I2, Attach.3, p.78, L.24 - p.79, L.I; p.80, L.IO.) In addition, Mr. Parmenter 
made assertions on the record immediately after jury selection, referencing the presence of 
potential prejudice and bias against Mr. Dunlap which was still prevalent, particularly in a 
community of this size. (32773 Tr. Vo1.5., p.2, Ls.3-I3.) While it is certainly true that a jury 
completely ignorant of the facts and issues in Mr. Dunlap's case was not demanded by the 
Constitution, it is also true that an unbiased and fair jury comprised of jurors who had not already 
decided to take Mr. Dunlap's life, was. Trial counsel failed to protect Mr. Dunlap's right to fair 
trial before an impartial jury, and were ineffective in failing to do so. That Judge Harding would 
have erred in denying a renewed motion to change venue is beside the point; trial counsel should 
have made a record of the prejudice and bias of selected jurors, as well as the bias within the 
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community, but failed to do so. See, e.g., State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 793 (1997) ("Defense 
counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress will constitute ineffective counsel if the reviewing 
court determines that the evidence at issue would have been suppressed."). Mr. Dunlap was 
prejudiced by the venue in which his sentencing took place. 
V. The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Dunlap's Claim That His Rights to A 
Fair Trial And To Confront And Cross-Examine Witnesses And Evidence Against Him, 
Guaranteed By The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, And Fourteenth Amendments, Were Violated By Juror 
Use Of Extrinsic Evidence And By Juror Bias 
A review of the State's Response reveals a limited response is warranted, but Mr. Dunlap 
otherwise relies on his prior briefing. (Appellant's Brief, pp.69-70; R.37270, pp.824-25.) The 
district court summarily dismissed this claim because "[t]here is no affidavit that says that they 
had a dictionary delivered or they relied on any definition from a dictionary." (R.37270, p.1955.) 
The State disregards and minimizes the affidavit of Mr. Dunlap's investigator, submitted in lieu 
of Juror Kunz's affidavit, as inadmissible evidence. The State fails to explain how Mr. Dunlap's 
investigator's affidavit, for purposes of summary disposition, is insufficient or does not qualify 
under Idaho Code Section 19-4906. Although Juror Kunz told Mr. Dunlap's investigator the 
information contained in the draft affidavit was accurate, he refused to sign the affidavit because 
"Mr. Kunz did not wish to assist in setting aside Mr. Dunlap's death sentence." (R.37270, 
p.1094, Pet'r's Ex.512, Attach.18, p.2.) 
Furthermore, Mr. Dunlap's presentation of evidence regarding prejudicial statements 
made by alternate Juror Hansen about wanting to deliberate and hang Mr. Dunlap, to other 
jurors, was sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. Juror Hansen sat through the entire 
sentencing with other jurors, not knowing until the case was submitted that he would be an 
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alternate and would not deliberate. The State cites cases involving prospective jurors who make 
prejudicial comments about a defendant during voir dire for the proposition that Juror Hansen's 
comments were not prejudicial "and the remaining jurors agreed to lay aside any preconceived 
impressions or opinions and render a verdict on the evidence presented in court." (Resp. Br., 
p.69.) These citations are misplaced--Juror Hansen was selected-- he was not excused after his 
prejudicial statement with a cautionary instruction to the remaining jurors. 
At a minimum, Mr. Dunlap submitted evidence which establishes a prima facie case both 
that his jury relied on extrinsic information provided by the court (dictionary), and the seated 
jurors who sentenced him to death were exposed to the prejudicial views of an alternate juror, 
which rendered the panel's fairness, impartiality and lack of bias questionable. Is Mr. Dunlap met 
his burden; viewing the facts and evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Dunlap, summary 
dismissal of this claim was improper. 
VI. The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Dunlap's Claim That He Was 
Denied His Sixth Amendment Right To The Effective Assistance Of Counsel Due To Counsels' 
Failure To Object To Shackling And The Overwhelming Presence Of Law Enforcement, Which 
Violated His Fifth, Sixth, Eighth And Fourteenth Amendment Rights Under The United States 
Constitution 
Mr. Dunlap presented evidence that at least two jurors knew Mr. Dunlap was wearing 
restraints during the sentencing trial. (37270 R., p.1094, Pet'r's EX.SI2, Attachs.18-19 (Juror 
Neibaur), 46 (Juror Lindstrom).) While the State attempts, on appeal, to put its own spin on Juror 
Neibaur's statements regarding the restraints, it is without question Juror Neibaur could tell 
Mr. Dunlap was restrained. (ld., Attach. 19.) The district court even acknowledged the restraint 
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impacted Mr. Dunlap's gait in a way that was obvious. (37270 R., pp.l957-58; R.37270, p.l094, 
Pet'r's Ex.512, Attach.3, p.213, Ls.18-20.) The State did not attempt to challenge this evidence 
below, and indeed, it is unrebutted. 
The State attempts to prove the district court followed the law when it required 
Mr. Dunlap to be restrained with a leg brace by referencing a passing comment made by 
Mr. Archibald in his deposition. Mr. Archibald was asked by undersigned counsel if he had ever 
discussed objecting to Mr. Dunlap wearing the leg brace during the trial, and Mr. Archibald 
responded, "We did talk about security. And that's how the judge wanted to do it." (R.37270, 
p.l094, Pet'r's Ex.512, Attach.3, p.l4, L.IO.) When and where any such discussion may have 
occurred is a mystery; the State has cited no place in the record of the underlying proceedings 
reflecting that a discussion of this nature occurred. Assuming the issue was discussed, it was not 
discussed on the record, and it cannot be assumed the district court made findings that do not 
exist. 
The State presented no evidence or argument below demonstrating a special need for 
Mr. Dunlap to be restrained, nor did the district court find a special need existed for Mr. Dunlap 
to be visibly restrained. Deck v. "Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 626 (2005) (visible shackling 
permissible "only in the presence of a special need."). In permitting the use of shackling, a 
district court must "take account of special circumstances, including security concerns .... But 
any such determination must be case specific; that is to say, it should reflect particular concerns, 
say, special security needs or escape risks, related to the defendant on trial." ld. at 633. The court 
15 That Juror Hansen made it through jury selection at all, was designated as an alternate, and did 
not deliberate and decide Mr. Dunlap's fate, simply by chance, is a testament to the inadequacy 
of voir dire in this case to ferret out biased jurors who had already made up their minds. 
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below did not refer to Mr. Dunlap's Ohio offense, did not refer to any risk Mr. Dunlap posed 
were he unrestrained, did not refer to any behavior or conduct by Mr. Dunlap in the courtroom, 
present or past, demonstrating he was a risk of danger to people in the courtroom, and made no 
reference to any prior escape attempts. The court's after-the-fact, hindsight attempts to justify 
the restraints after having become aware of the law governing the use of restraints in this post-
conviction proceeding, are insufficient. The court abused its discretion in ordering the use of 
restraints that were visible to jurors, without any justification, and trial counsel were ineffective 
in failing to object to the restraints. The State bore the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the restraints did not contribute to the verdict, but failed to do so; the State must be 
held to its burden, which requires remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing. 
Trial counsel were similarly ineffective in failing to object to the overwhelming presence 
of security measures and law enforcement at Mr. Dunlap's sentencing. (Appellant's Br., pp.72-
74; R.37270, pp. 831-35.) 
VII. The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Dunlap's Claim That He Was 
Denied His Sixth Amendment Right To The Effective Assistance Of Counsel Due To Counsels' 
Failure To Adequately Investigate And Present Mitigating Evidence, And Rebut The 
Prosecution's Case In Aggravation 
The district cOUli erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Dunlap's claim that his counsels' 
failure to adequately investigate and present mitigation evidence, and rebut the State's case in 
aggravation, was ineffective. (Appellant's Br., pp.74-88; R.37270, pp.993-1048.) It must be 
clarified that Dr. Cunningham did not testify at the sentencing; rather, his prior, dated testimony 
was read into the record by a court clerk in an unconvincing and unintelligible manner. 
(R.37270, p.1094, Pet'r's Ex.512, Attachs.20, 28,54.) 
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Continuing Threat To Society. The State maintains that whether Mr. Dunlap is dangerous 
when medicated is irrelevant to the propensity aggravator. CRespo Br., pp.91-92.) In so arguing, 
the State disregards the "will probably constitute a continuing threat to society" language of the 
aggravator. This Court has construed the propensity aggravator "to specify that person who is a 
willing, predisposed killer, a killer who tends toward destroying the life of another, one who kills 
with less than the nonnal amount of provocation. We would hold that propensity assumes a 
proclivity, susceptibility, and even an affinity toward committing the act of murder." State v. 
Creech, 105 Idaho 362,371 (1983). This defines only part of the propensity aggravator. 
Even assuming the State could prove Mr. Dunlap met the first portion of this aggravator, 
the fact that he is not dangerous to society in the least while properly medicated means the State 
cannot prove Mr. Dunlap "will probably constitute a continuing threat to society." When 
Mr. Dunlap's mental illness is properly controlled through medication, he poses no threat of 
violence or hann, let alone murder, to society. Trial counsel were ineffective in failing to present 
this evidence to the jury, which would have undennined the propensity aggravator. 
Dr. Estess' s 1995 Treatment Notes. Because mitigating evidence is virtually unrestricted 
in capital cases, while evidence in aggravation should be governed by the Rules of Evidence, the 
district court should have admitted the mitigating 1995 treatment notes authored by Dr. Estess 
confinning Mr. Dunlap's mental illness, but while excluding his prejudicial 1992 testimony and 
report. Any references to Dr. Estess's involvement in Mr. Dunlap's case in 1992 could have been 
redacted from the 1995 treatment notes presented to the jury. 
Letter Written By Mr. Dunlap To Tonya Crane's Husband. The State claims "[b]ecause 
Dunlap never provided the district court with a copy of the letter written by Dunlap to Jeff 
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[Crane], there is no admissible evidence to support this claim." This is false. The letter 
Mr. Dunlap wrote to Mr. Crane was submitted twice to the district court for consideration, both 
as an attachment to Mr. Dunlap's May 7, 2009 Response to Brief in Support of Respondent's 
Motion for Summary Dismissal, and as an exhibit to Mr. Parmenter's deposition. (R.37270, 
p.1872, Pet'r's Ex.5I8, Ex.lS; R.37270, p.1094, Pet'r's Ex.512, Attach.2, Ex.29.) The State also 
relies on Mr. Parmenter's claim that he did not present Mr. Dunlap's apology letter at sentencing 
because he had already presented "quite a bit of evidence regarding remorse" and the letter 
would have been redundant. (R.37270, p.1094, Pet'r's Ex.512, Attach.2, pp.202-03.) The State 
fails to cite the "quite a bit of evidence regarding remorse" that trial counsel presented at 
sentencing because it does not exist, instead citing to Mr. Dunlap's allocution statement, which 
in fact was the only evidence of remorse presented on Mr. Dunlap's behalf. (Resp. Br., p.98.) 
VIII. The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Dunlap's Claim That He Was 
Denied His Sixth Amendment Right To Effective Assistance Of Counsel When Counsel Relied 
On Depositions, Prior Testimony, And Documentary Evidence In Closing Argument, In Lieu of 
Live Witness Testimony 
The district court erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Dunlap's claim that his attorneys 
were ineffective in relying on depositions, prior recorded testimony, and documentary evidence 
in closing argument, in lieu oflive testimony. 16 (Appellant's Br., pp.88-92; R.37270, pp.989-93.) 
16 The primary reason appellate courts defer to credibility determinations made by a trial court is 
because the court has had the opportunity to see the witnesses testify in person. See I.R.c.P. 
52(a) ("Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. In the application of this 
principle regard shall be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility 
of those witnesses who appear personally before it."); cf Shabinaw v. Brown, 131 Idaho 747, 
751 (1998) (although appellate courts generally review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a 
new trial for an abuse of discretion and will not disturb the decision absent a manifest abuse of 
discretion, where a motion for a new trial is heard and passed upon by a judge who did not 
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The State argues trial counsel likely gained a tactical advantage by submitting this mitigation 
evidence in a written manner. 
It is unclear what tactical advantage trial counsel gained by submitting evidence other 
than through live testimony, and the State seems to have no idea either, aside from rank 
speculation. (Resp. Br. pp.l 00-0 1.) While the State is correct that the jury had an opportunity to 
review the more than 400 pages of documents submitted to them during closing argument in a 
binder, without an index, the State ignores the fact jurors did not review these documents; we 
know they did not review these documents based on trial counsels' own admission that the jury 
did not have possession of the binder long enough to review its contents. The State's 
characterization of the documents in the binder as the equivalent of birth certificates which could 
not be aided by live testimony is absurd, as is the State's reliance on Parmenter's statement that 
he thought Mr. Dunlap's history had been fairly presented through family testimony. (Resp. Br., 
p.99.) It is unclear what the relevance of Parmenter's belief is, where it is unsupported by the 
record. 
The State argues that trial counsel may have believed Mr. Dunlap was "better off' with 
recorded rather than live testimony, and that the witnesses may have been less compelling in 
person, but cites to nothing in the record to demonstrate that would have been the case. The State 
also fails to identify any possible inculpatory evidence it would have elicited through the cross-
examination of Terry Clem, Dr. Cunningham, and Judge Richard Striegel, had Mr. Dunlap been 
reside at trial and an appeal is taken, the appellate court has to examine and weigh the evidence 
the same as the nisi prius court should do). 
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allowed to exercise his right to compulsory process through the presentation of their live, in-
person, testimony. Of the four non-family members who "testified" for Mr. Dunlap, only one, 
Dr. Beaver, was allowed to testify live. In post-conviction, Mr. Dunlap presented affidavits from 
people who were present at Mr. Dunlap's sentencing trial. Each witness averred how absolutely 
unpersuasive the reading of the transcript proved to be for those who observed it. (R.37270, 
p.I094, Pet'r's Ex.SI2, Attachs.20, 28, 54.) Where the State has failed to acknowledge 
Mr. Dunlap's evidence, let alone rebut it, the district court erred in summarily dismissing this 
claim without.a hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons identified herein, in his Appellant's Brief, and in post-conviction 
proceedings before the district court, Mr. Dunlap was deprived of his right to a sentencing trial 
free of constitutional error before a fair and impartial jury. As a result, his death sentence must 
be set aside and his case remanded for a new sentencing. (See R.32773, passim; 32773 Pretrial 
and Trial Transcripts, passim.) 
Even assuming this Court does not find the trial errors require a new sentencing, at a 
minimum, the district court's summary dismissal of Mr. Dunlap's Final Petition was erroneous. 
Mr. Dunlap raised numerous claims in his Final Petition, which he supported by admissible 
evidence that was largely undisputed by the State. When viewed in the light most favorable to 
Mr. Dunlap, these claims entitle him to relief; at a minimum, Mr. Dunlap has proven there are 
disputed issues of material fact which, if resolved in his favor, entitle him to relief. (R.37270, 
Supp.R.37270, and all post-conviction transcripts, passim.) Thus, the district court's order 
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summarily dismissing the Final Petition must be vacated and the case remanded for an 
evidentiary hearing. 
DATED this 21 st day of November, 2011. 
SHANNON N. RoMERO 
Counsel for Mr. Dunlap 
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